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ABSTRACT 
This thesis looks at the discord between asymmetric warfare and just war theory. 
Specifically, it looks at the place of just war theory in political science, and the competing 
theories that analyse war. Consequently, it looks at the specific problems that face just war 
theory in an asymmetric warfare context, by looking at the three parts of just war theory. The 
first is jus ad bellum, the justice of war, and looks at the decision to go to war. The second is 
jus in bello, the justice in war, and looks at the conduct of war. The final is jus post bellum, 
and looks at the conclusion of war. By the end of this thesis, I aim to have provided a basis 
for reconciling asymmetric warfare and just war theory. 
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Preface  
 
The idea for the topic of this thesis came from a number of conversations about the 
lack of substantial moral political thought, especially in regards to international relations and 
the waging of war. My Christian standpoint therefore brought me to just war theory, 
especially the works of the theologians who had written in this area. The chief influence in 
this regard has been Oliver O’Donovan’s The Just War Revisited, a book that has aimed to 
show how classical Christian just war theory remains relevant in today’s international 
political environment. Not without its shortcomings, the book has provided me with a deep 
insight into the way that political science can be analysed from a Christian moral perspective. 
This work, therefore, is an attempt to enter into that literature, to fill what I believe is 
a gap where other authors have only touched briefly. Unfortunately, it cannot and will not fill 
that gap completely, as there are many issues that I come across that I cannot do justice. This 
work will not provide an in-depth account of the moral sub-structure that underpins the entire 
work. In this regard, I sympathise with Michael Walzer who laments the same problem. He 
comments, “I am not going to expound morality from the ground up…The substructure of the 
ethical world is a matter of deep and unending controversy. Meanwhile, however, we are 
living in the superstructure…” (Walzer, M., 2000: xxi). In difference to Walzer, however, I 
wish to make clear the principles of the substructure that I am basing the following analysis 
on. While just war theory provides people of different moral systems with a common moral 
language with which to converse, I believe that the substructure that underpins the 
assumptions is equally important in the conversation, and needs to be clear. 
The first principle is the importance and worth of the individual. Underpinning the 
just war and the insistence on the limiting of violence and suffering is the fact that the 
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individual has worth, and that their suffering is undesirable if not completely wrong. In this 
regard, accounts of war in terms of prudence do not sufficiently explain why there is such an 
emphasis on limiting war’s effects. Where does the individual gain his worth from, and why 
is life respected? The Christian worldview provides such a perspective: individuals, men and 
women, are created in the image of God. It is a description of the way that God made 
humanity, in the likeness of his character. Anything that harms that creation, like suffering 
and death, therefore tarnishes the image of God, and is therefore inherently evil (wrong). 
Similarly, the importance of the individual means that any account of political science 
must portray, even in part, the  agency of individuals in the international realm. In this way, 
accounts of war that focus purely on the state (Westphalian sovereignty) neglect the role of 
the individual. From the outset, just war theory has placed the individual in a position of 
responsibility, be it the leaders (the prince or the prime minister) or the soldier. The 
responsibility and accountability of the individual is an assumption that remains at the heart 
of just war theory, and underpins many of the principles that it espouses. Why is this so? 
Amongst other things, theologian John Stott explains that God created humanity with the 
ability to be rational and moral (Stott, J., 2006: 62). How else would they be able to both 
understand and respond to God’s commands? The implication is that if humanity is both 
rational and moral, then it is also responsible and accountable. Humans are free to make 
decisions as they will, and as such, are subject to moral praise and blame. While “the Fall” 
(the break in the perfect relationship with God and the corruption of sin upon the world) may 
diminish humanity’s capacity to be perfectly moral or rational, this does not mean that it is 
not responsible or accountable. Responsibility and accountability may be diminished, but not 
completely denied. Rather, it is in the context of the Fall that Elshtain makes the comment 
that war is “tragically necessary” – in a world that is corrupted by sin, the oft-quoted idea of 
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‘beating swords into plowshares’1 is eschatological and not of this age, and conflict is 
something that will continue to be.  
This thesis will therefore attempt to analyse a way forward for the restricted exercise 
of the tragic necessity of war. “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants” places just war theory in 
the context of political thought as a whole. It will describe asymmetric (counterinsurgency) 
warfare, which is the more difficult test of just war theory as it places stress on the various 
principles inherent in the theory, and is the more common type of warfare today. This chapter 
will also provide a description of war as a means of achieving justice in an anarchic world 
system. In doing so, this definition will overcome the problems that just war theory has in 
being applied to asymmetric warfare. The subsequent three chapters will deal with jus ad 
bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum respectively. 
 “In Good Conscience” will look at how the decision to go to war becomes difficult in 
an asymmetric context because of the interconnectedness between the “civilian” and the 
“insurgent”. This means that casualties are going to be proportionally higher than in a 
conventional context, and therefore the decision to go to war, and the principles that influence 
that decision, must be placed in this context.2 As such, I look at four specific problems: that 
of ‘right intention’, ‘proportionality of ends’, and ‘right authority’. 
“Defining the Limits”, which discusses the most difficult discord between the 
principles of just war theory and counterinsurgency by analysing the puzzle distinction and 
discrimination between the ‘civilian’ and the ‘insurgent’. Key to this chapter is the definition 
                                                            
1 He will judge between many peoples,  
       and will settle disputes for strong nations far and wide.  
       They will beat their swords into plowshares, 
       and their spears into pruning hooks.  
       Nation will not take up sword against nation,  
       nor will they train for war anymore. (Micah 4:3) 
2 For the moment, this is assumed, yet will be explained in the Just War Theory ‐ Application to Today: 
Counterinsurgency warfare section of Chapter 1. 
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of guilt as ‘the doing of harm’. Subsequently, I look at three particular puzzles, namely 
finding the balance between moral restraint and military prudence, the legitimacy of the 
insurgent and the subsequent use of ‘special measures’ by the counterinsurgent, and the idea 
of ‘playing by the rules’ when the other side does not. 
 “All’s Well That Ends Well” looks at the conclusion of war. This particular theme is 
one that has not received much attention, and in terms of just war theory, is quite a recent 
development. After first establishing what the principles of jus post bellum are, I then look at 
how themes of discrimination and proportionality remain central to just war theory, and are 
therefore important in the establishment of a just peace and the development of actor 
culpability. I look at how ‘guilt’ affects discrimination in post-war settlements, how the call 
for compensation and rehabilitation will affect post-war order, and whether war-crimes 
tribunals are appropriate in the context of asymmetric warfare.  
By the end of this thesis, I aim to have provided an in-depth discussion of the theory 
behind the just war tradition, and to show how it can remain relevant to the contemporary 
security environment. In doing so, I wish to show that just war theory provides a strong 
analytical and normative framework for the study of war. As such, this thesis will by no 
means entirely fill the current gap in the just war theory literature, but hopefully will, like the 
previous works of such authors as Walzer, O’Donovan, and Orend, provide a basis upon 
which further analysis can be done. 
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Standing on the Shoulders of Giants  
Placing Just War Theory in Context 
Chapter 1 
Just War Theory - Defining the Place. 
“Is Just War Theory worthy of a place in political science?” 
The just war tradition, often referred to as just war theory, is the predominant 
normative theory that attempts to address the problem of war and peace. The purpose of the 
just war tradition has been to limit war as far as possible, in light of its persistence, and the 
responsibility of politicians to the welfare of their constituencies (Bellamy, A. J., 2006: iii). 
Authors like Bellamy can trace this normative line of thought back to  antiquity, with writers 
like Thucydides describing traditions and practices that limited war, and Plato writing 
prescriptions for how war should be fought (Bellamy, A. J., 2006: 15-17). The just war 
tradition has had a significant impact on international law, with concepts like Augustine’s jus 
ad bellum, the justice of war, Aquinas’ jus in bello, the justice in war, and more recently 
Suarez’s jus post bellum, the justice after war, being incorporated into positive law, as seen in 
the UN Charter, and the Geneva Conventions and Protocols (Bellamy, A. J., 2006: 4), 
(Patterson, E., 2005: 42).  
However, there are problems with the just war as a theory from a philosophical 
position. In terms of semantics, just war theory is not a theory (in the sense that Waltz would 
use it – explanation of phenomena (Waltz, K. N., 1979: 5-6)), but rather a practical 
framework: a set of principles that provide governments and individual soldiers alike a moral 
and ethical structure for the waging and limitation of war (O'Donovan, O., 2003: 6). Simply 
referring to these principles as the just war tradition seems to overcome this problem, yet fails 
to address the fundamental question of whether the just war tradition has a rightful place in 
international political theory. Authors like Shapcott think of international relations as 
“practical philosophy” (Shapcott, R., 2004: 271). He explains,  
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A practical philosophy in the classical sense sees theory as a moral and political inquiry 
involving a body of knowledge and a philosophy of practice engaging in reflection upon 
the nature of the good life and the means to achieve it (Shapcott, R., 2004: 271). 
This links well with just war theory because just war theory is exactly that: it is a “moral and 
political inquiry” that focuses on the “good life” (the ideal of peace), and the “means to 
achieve it” (through the limiting of war).  
Hedley Bull would disagree with this definition, however (even though Shapcott 
insists that “practical philosophy” is based on what Bull calls the “classical approach” (Bull, 
H., 1966: 361)) due to the fact that it is practical, and therefore is “a question of ‘social 
engineering’…” not of political theory (Bull, H., 1979: 589).  ‘Political theory’ is defined as a 
“reflection about substantive political and moral issues” (Bull, H., 1979: 591). There is a fine 
line, therefore, to be drawn: balancing on the one hand the necessity to avoid ‘social 
engineering’ (limiting war “so that it can serve as an instrument of policy”) while at the same 
time, avoiding becoming too abstract. 
The second problem is raised specifically by Bull in regards to the problem with 
basing a theory of international relations on morality. He argues, 
…what deters us from embarking upon serious inquiry into these matters (or, at all 
events, what deters us from attempting to write books about them) is the feeling that there 
are no authorities to guide us in this field, that arguments about the morality of war – by 
contrast with arguments about what causes it, what limits it, what policies it serves or 
what positive legal rules regulate it – are a matter of mere opinion (Bull, H., 1979: 589). 
In situations where there is a common moral reference point, like in medieval Christendom, 
this is not an issue, because of the common acknowledgement of the divine authority of 
Christ. As such, Bull notes that it is no surprise that a majority of the literature based on 
moral foundations is written from a Christian theology (Bull, H., 1979: 590). However, there 
is no such common moral reference point today and morality therefore seems purely relative. 
In this sense, morality becomes “a matter of mere opinion”. 
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Yet Bull’s observation holds only in situations where morality is based purely on 
factors that differ across, in this case, religions. Walzer argues that despite differing 
foundations of morality, the morality of war can be discussed fruitfully because there exists a 
common moral language (Walzer, M., 2000: xx-xxi). Despite differing conceptions of 
morality, Thucydides illustrates that the Melians and the Athenians shared a moral 
vocabulary that enabled them to converse on moral topics. This particular example shows 
how just war theory has an analytical component. Bellamy argues that it is the just war 
tradition that provides such a common moral language that allows for the evaluation of the 
“justness” of acts in war (Bellamy, A. J., 2005: 278).  
Alternatively, the problem of “subjectivity” may be overcome through criticism on its 
own terms. As Halliday points out, 
…the way to overcome this situation, to demonstrate that awareness of morality does not 
entail a collapse into relativism, and to anchor the debate about ethical choices in 
international politics within a realistic context, is to produce rigorous work on the ethical 
issues that pervade the international arena (Halliday, F., 1996: 326). 
Subsequently, it is possible to use Walzer’s own methodology (which Bull seems to overlook 
in his review of the 1977 edition of Walzer’s book), and analyse moral claims by their 
internal coherence and logic, observe their implementation, and reveal moral hypocrisy 
(which he claims is the most important form of moral criticism); all of which places the 
emphasis not the observer, but on the subject (Walzer, M., 2000: xxi). 
Just War Theory - Responding to Critique 
Realism and the need for prudence 
In contrast to just war theory, which holds that as political decisions are inherently 
moral (like other calculated and rational social activities), realism argues that nothing should 
stand in the way of the security of the state. Particularly in the case of war and conflict, in the 
pursuit of military objectives the primary consideration should be prudence. As Morgenthau 
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argues, “Realism… considers prudence – the weighing of the consequences of alternative 
political actions – to be the supreme virtue in politics” (Morgenthau, H. J., et al., 2006: 12). 
In contrast to just war theory, realism holds that the political and the moral are completely 
different spheres of thought, and therefore should not overlap. While realism is aware of the 
“moral significance of political action”, it does not believe that morality should limit action, 
especially when the state’s survival is at stake (Morgenthau, H. J., Thompson, K. W. and 
Clinton, W. D., 2006: 12). Furthermore, there is a large divide between the individual and the 
state, especially in terms of morality. Morgenthau advocates what could be called a dual 
morality, a public morality – focussing on the state’s responsibility to care for those who live 
within its borders – and the private morality of the individual.  
However, just war theory and realism are not as completely incompatible as one may 
think. Rather, Bellamy notes that just war theory has “echoes” of realist thought throughout 
(Bellamy, A. J., 2006: 119). As just war theory is often considered the ‘midpoint’ between 
the moral extremes of realism and pacifism, it is no surprise that realism has some influence 
on it, and more than that, realism is an important strand within it. Not all realists hold the 
position that morality (or at least moral restraint) has no place in international politics; 
furthermore, realism in just war theory ensures the balance between morality and prudence. 
Realism also offers an analysis of politics, power and interests that shape judgements about 
the legitimacy of war (Bellamy, A. J., 2006: 116). Realism’s focus on state security is also 
important in reminding just war theorists that a state is morally obliged to ensure the welfare 
of its citizens above those outside its jurisdiction (Bellamy, A. J., 2006: 118). 
Pacifism and the need for morality 
Pacifism can be described as having two forms, deontological and consequential. 
Deontological pacifism argues that killing is intrinsically wrong, and “that there are no 
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situations, real or imaginary, in which resort to war would be the lesser evil” (Bellamy, A. J., 
2005: 279-280). This school of thought is often dominated by Christian theologians, who cite 
the idea of ‘turning the other cheek’3 as the fundamental Biblical perspective. Abbott argues 
that this “passive non-resistance” should be coupled with “impartial arbitration”, the 
alternative to forceful resolution of conflict (Abbott, L., 2005: 292-294). Bellamy shows that 
deontological pacifism has evolved into a form of consequentialist pacifism, by arguing that 
there are situations which could theoretically exist in which war may be permissible,  yet “the 
moral constraints on war are interpreted in such a way as to make it highly unlikely that any 
war would meet the criteria” (Bellamy, A. J., 2005: 294). More recently, the Christian 
perspective has moved in this direction, with the US Catholic Bishops (United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1983), and the Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury 
(Williams, R., 2003) both advocating a “presumption against war” or a “presumption against 
violence”, which argues that the Christian scriptures argue first for a peaceful settlement of 
disputes, and in “exceptional cases” some use of force is permitted (determined by the 
principles of just war theory). 
The second form of pacifism is consequentialist, which goes a little further than the 
“presumption against violence” to argue that despite the fact that war may be theoretically 
permissible, it is only because of the nature of the current forms of warfare that it is wrong. 
Whereas deontological pacifism (“presumption against violence”) argues that killing is wrong 
per se, consequential pacifism argues that it is the current form of warfare that is wrong, 
implying that if the nature of war was to change, then there could exist theoretically, a war 
that satisfied the moral prerequisites. In contrast to realists or just war theorists, consequential 
                                                            
3 [Jesus said] “You have heard that it was said, 'Eye for eye, and tooth for tooth.' But I tell you, Do not resist an 
evil person. If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if someone wants to 
sue you and take your tunic, let him have your cloak as well. If someone forces you to go one mile, go with him 
two miles. Give to the one who asks you, and do not turn away from the one who wants to borrow from you.” 
(Matt. 5:38-42) 
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pacifists have a much higher moral “threshold”, such that war in its current form is unable to 
be morally justified. Holmes argues that while war may not be morally reprehensible on the 
theoretical level, it is so in the practical sense. He argues that “the conditions that might 
theoretically justify war are not met in the actual world; hence that war is impermissible in 
the world as we know it” (Holmes, R. L., 1989: 14). He blends deontological pacifism (the 
killing of innocents is inherently wrong) with consequential pacifism (in wars, innocents die, 
so therefore war is wrong).  
Why Just War Theory Remains 
Yet both realist and pacifist positions are unsatisfying. Realism’s ‘amorality’ fails to 
allow for restraint, while pacifism’s extreme morality fails to provide any way forward for 
the moral conduct of war. The main criticism of the predominance of prudence in realism is 
that in practice, there is little to no room for moral restraint. Often equated with ‘military 
necessity’, the logic of prudence places military objectives in the name of state survival as 
being the end objective in war, and demands that these objectives be the highest priority. 
Therefore, measures that call for moderation or (moral) restraint in war become absurd, as 
they inhibit the ability for the state to achieve its objectives, and could even cause them to fail 
(Holmes, R. L., 1989). Pacifism is also a problem. If there is no way that war can be morally 
justifiable then there is nothing to stop the execution of war becoming ‘amoral’. As Bellamy 
writes (in reference to the “War on Terror”),  
“An ethics of war that cannot hold an insightful discussion into the actual conduct of war 
will remain peripheral in wartime. If we simply reject the war on terror as unjust, we risk 
inadvertently conceding a free hand to those who support the war to execute it free of 
moral restraints.”(Bellamy, A. J., 2005: 281). 
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Just War Theory - Establishing Principles 
Definition 
Just war theory has been described hitherto as a practical framework for the ethical 
execution of war. It is a set of principles that aim to provide those who make the decision to 
go to war, those who fight the war, and those who manage the aftermath, can do so with 
minimal suffering and impact. Yet it is erroneous to assume that this body of literature is a 
single coherent voice; rather there are a multitude of variants, each of which emphasise 
different aspects or are usually based on different assumptions: there are two that stand out as 
distinctive, and therefore require special attention. 
Christian 
There are a number of ideals that make the Christian just war perspective distinct. Firstly, just 
war theory can be regarded as a series of exceptions. Just war theory grew out of a historical 
context in which the use of violence was regarded as an anomaly. As Hauerwas asks, “…why 
would you even have to come up with a justification for violence if, as a matter of fact, you 
assumed the priority of non-violence on the part of these people?” (Elshtain, J. B., et al., 
2001). Inherent in this is the fact that at an individual level, it is better to accept personal 
harm than to commit it, yet there is also the justification to use force to protect the innocent; 
acting out of love for one’s neighbour. On a societal level, violence (and by extension war) is 
inherently wrong, but the resort to war is “tragically necessary” (Elshtain, J. B., Hauerwas, S. 
and Johnson, J. T., 2001). It is wrong because of the fact that it causes great harm (destroying 
the image of God), yet it is necessary because of the need to protect the innocent (those who 
are incapable of defending themselves) from certain harm (Elshtain, J. B., Hauerwas, S. and 
Johnson, J. T., 2001). As such, this protection of the innocent, this acting out of love for one’s 
neighbour, has been institutionalised into the responsibility of government, an body that “is 
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charged with a solemn responsibility for which there is a divine warrant” (Elshtain, J. B., 
Hauerwas, S. and Johnson, J. T., 2001). 
Legalist 
The legalist variant argues is that the principles of just war theory are akin to a checklist that 
have to be ticked off, and that a war is just only when each of these principles are fulfilled. 
This has increasingly become the case, as such principles have become codified in 
international law. This tradition has grown only relatively recently, due to the 
Enlightenment’s dispute of Christ as the common moral authority, and the abuse of ‘right 
authority’ and ‘just cause’ by Christian princes during the “holy wars” of Europe in the late 
16th and early 17th century. As morality had hitherto been the foundation of just war theory, 
many scholars looked elsewhere for its basis, and found it in the growing body of 
international (positive) law. In this context, Westphalian sovereignty precipitated a shift away 
from the individual to look at the responsibility of the state.  
Furthermore, many just war theorists use international law and international 
institutions for the enforcement of its principles. As such, O’Donovan argues that the 
authority to go to war lies in a conspicuous right, and  “the want of a formal institution to 
enforce it” (O'Donovan, O., 2003: 25). He continues by saying that at the root of moral 
authority to make war is a judicial authority” (O'Donovan, O., 2003: 25). In fact, 
O’Donovan’s “revisiting” of the classical just war theory is depicted almost entirely in legal 
terms, and enforced by institutions. 
Just War Theory - Application to Today: Counterinsurgency warfare 
While the post-911 world has been dominated by the discourse of the “War on 
Terror”, a broader observation shows that there is a decrease in conventional conflict and an 
increase in asymmetric conflict. Mandelbaum argues that major war is becoming obsolete: 
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“Major war is not impossible… A major war is unlikely but not unthinkable” (Mandelbaum, 
M., 1998: 20). This ‘revolution in military affairs’, this idea that countries (powers and 
aspirants) “will structure their armed forces in similar ways to prepare for some rather 
standardised encounters”, is not impossible, but increasingly unlikely (Freedman, L., 2006: 
49)4. Coupled with this is the fact that not all ‘players’ can match this level of power, such 
that the possibility that future wars would be fought conventionally is minimal: even if two 
great powers, like the US and China, go to war, there is still a great asymmetry of power 
between the two. As such, there is an increasing resort to alternative strategies, or what 
Freedman calls asymmetric strategies:  
If the promise of precision warfare lies in keeping casualties and economic damage down 
on both sides and confining them largely to the military sphere, the same logic might lead 
those seeking to discourage Western military action to adopt tactics and weapons that 
have exactly the opposite effects (Freedman, L., 2006: 51). 
Asymmetric conflict is not a new phenomenon, with guerrilla and insurgency wars 
being found in numerous historical instances. What is new is the composition and motive of 
the insurgent, and the reciprocal shift in the state’s strategic thinking to focus on this type of 
warfare. The Cold War era led to an interpretation of insurgency through the lens of 
Communism, like the cases of Vietnam and Cuba. Insurgency in this context was still 
predominately the province of the state. This is no longer the case in the post-911 world. Sub-
state actors, which act independent of the state, are now engaging in insurgent conflicts. The 
case of the most recent war between Israel and Hizbollah in 2006 is the perfect example of 
this. What makes Hizbollah a peculiar case is the fact that they are an independent 
organisation, and yet they still have strong links to the state. On the one hand, Hizbollah acts 
like a service provider for the community, providing such things as health care and education 
                                                            
4 Interestingly enough, this RMA is based on the increasing importance of “a line of political expectation and of 
ethical thinking in Western societies, based on the Christian just war tradition and liberal values, with questions 
of discrimination and proportionality in warfare to the fore.”Freedman, L., (2006), "Asymmetric War", Adelphi 
Papers, 45:379 49-60.. 
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in situations where the state itself cannot. Furthermore, it stands for election, and is a genuine 
part of the Lebanese political system. Yet on the other hand, Hizbollah implements its own 
“foreign policy”, acting outside the government through its own military forces that stand 
apart from the conventional Lebanese Army. On the other side of the war, Israel’s actions and 
tactics in the conflict with Hizbollah provide an interesting study, as this is a situation where 
a state is ‘taking on’ this newer form of insurgency.  
 Most importantly for this study, the fact that in the context of Westphalian 
sovereignty and statism, the role of sub state actors is neglected. The ability for Hizbollah to 
act outside the authority of the state (to be a sub-state actor that acts not in an internal conflict 
but in an external one), and yet still remain “subservient” to it means that the Westphalian 
model that provides the theoretical basis for just war theory is insufficient: a post-
Westphalian model is required that more fully integrates the role of sub-state actors. It is to 
this development that just war theory now needs to be applied. In this sense, 
counterinsurgency provides the most striking tension with the principles of just war theory, 
and therefore as a case study provides the most interesting analysis. 
Merom, in addition to providing an analysis of counterinsurgency, also importantly 
provides a model for the interaction between “civil society” and the political leadership (“the 
state”) in democratic countries. Drawing on three concepts employed in Merom’s analysis of 
small wars, it becomes increasingly clear why asymmetric conflict is unique. “Instrumental 
dependence” is the degree to which the state relies on society to provide resources for 
national security policies, “normative difference” is the gap between the state and the 
“liberal” society in regards to the execution of the war in terms of cost and tactics (consisting 
of the “expedient” dimension – the cost in terms of casualties – and the “moral” dimension – 
the cost in terms of brutality), and “political relevance” is the influence of society on policy 
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(Merom, G., 2003: 18-21). Specifically, there is a dialectic between civil society and the 
state, whereby civil society may influence military strategy, because of the moral dimension 
of the conflict, through its provision of resources. Meanwhile, the state attempts to avoid this 
influence by reducing its instrumental dependence “at the risk of increasing the potential size 
of the moral dimension of normative difference (Merom, G., 2003: 22). Building on this 
analysis, just war theory provides a more stable basis for the moral dimension of the 
normative difference as the norms that currently underpin Merom’s analysis arguably ebb and 
flow depending on the situation, while the just war’s emphasis on morality and the restriction 
of war seems to have more permanence.  
Definition 
Insurgency is characterised by the use of small forces which are dependent on the 
support of the population for supply and shelter, and, due to the decentralised nature of the 
support, will often act independent of each other (Merom, G., 2003: 34). As Mao’s oft-quoted 
metaphor describes, “The people are the sea in which the insurgent fish swims and draws 
strength” (Deady, T. K., 2005: 58). Furthermore, the population has more than support value. 
As O’Donovan writes, the insurgents, 
…sometimes by choice but often by necessity, pursue a strategy of disseminating active 
armed units invisibly through the civil population. This puts the whole population in the 
position of a hostage shield, compelling a conventional military response to incur high 
levels of non-combatant damage (O'Donovan, O., 2003: 64). 
Therefore, insurgency warfare, by its very nature, involves the population at both a logistical 
and strategic level. Earlier, I mentioned that asymmetric warfare has a higher cost. How so? 
As we have seen, asymmetric warfare strategies can be defined as those that seek to 
undermine the RMA and conventional strategies. As a result, the “civil society” becomes tied 
to the conflict:  
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New options are also emerging for those anxious to maximise the human cost of war. 
Though there may be less excuse for crude and indiscriminate modes of war-fighting with 
the systems associated with the RMA, they do provide opportunities for those who 
deliberately seek to target civil society. 
Logically, if asymmetric warfare ties the insurgent and his civil society together, and also 
pursues a strategy of maximising human cost, then it is reasonable to assume that asymmetric 
warfare will have a proportionally higher cost in terms of civilian casualties than 
conventional conflict.  
Because (democratic) states wish to limit their dependence on society (instrumental 
dependence) through limiting the size and composition of their armies, while at the same 
time, they wish those same forces to remain effective, and/or reduce the risks to soldiers, 
“they must rely on higher and less discriminating levels of violence” (Merom, G., 2003: 22). 
In an asymmetric conflict, the normative difference (the tension between society and its 
political leaders based on the conflict) is accentuated because small wars are not critical to 
the existence of the state (Merom, G., 2003: 21). In short, because counterinsurgency is more 
violent and less existential, the moral dimension of the conflict is exaggerated, and therefore, 
of particular interest to just war theory. 
A Possible Answer? War as a Means of Achieving Justice 
Framing this problem requires a definition of war. The classic description is provided 
by Clausewitz, who defines war in terms of politics by other means. From the outset, 
Clausewitz’s definition of war describes any form of restraint or restriction on war as 
absurdity. War, therefore, is the “use of physical force to the utmost extent”, and in this 
“duel” between competitors, any restraint of this force by one will ultimately mean that the 
other gains superiority. Hence, “as one side dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of 
reciprocal action, which logically must lead to an extreme” (von Clausewitz, C., 1982: 103). 
Clausewitz is adamant that despite how much we may dislike this conception of war, “it is to 
S t a n d i n g   o n   t h e   S h o u l d e r s   o f   G i a n t s   P a g e  | 22 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Stephen McGuinness         200414325 
 
no purpose, it is even against one’s own interest, to turn away from the consideration of the 
real nature of the affair because the horror of its elements excites repugnance” (von 
Clausewitz, C., 1982: 102). Furthermore, war is a political act, yet more than that, it is “a real 
political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other 
means” (von Clausewitz, C., 1982: 119). Its political aim is that of “compel[ling] our 
opponent to fulfil our will” (von Clausewitz, C., 1982: 101). In this way, restraint is again an 
absurdity because it inhibits this political goal: a suspension of action (for example, a truce) is 
only explicable in that an actor is merely waiting for a more favourable moment for action 
(von Clausewitz, C., 1982: 111). 
This definition is somewhat deficient, though it does provide some important caveats 
for just war theory. It is deficient because of the political and security environment today. 
Clausewitz was writing in a period were military engagements were “limited” affairs when 
compared to the possible conflicts of the Cold War period and today. Specifically, it is in this 
context that Holmes describes his pacifism. For, on a theoretical level, if a war between two 
superpowers  were to “lead to an extreme”, then the consequence would not be simply the 
subjugation of one side to another’s will, it would be the annihilation of the entire globe 
through nuclear holocaust. On this level, Clausewitz’s argument that war leads to an extreme 
would mean that in the nuclear age, war would no longer be able to fulfil the goals that it was 
employed to achieve because of its destructive power (Holmes, R. L., 1989: 5-6). On a 
practical level, the horror and suffering caused by the spiral to extremes in World War Two 
has led to the gradual diminishing of large-scale war as an instrument that can achieve 
political ends. While Clausewitz makes a strong case for the political nature of war, 
describing it as a continuation of legitimate political processes, this gives war a legitimacy 
that today’s society does not share. For if war were simply a continuation of politics, why 
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would such institutions like the League of Nations or the United Nations (both products of 
the world wars) be created to prevent such events from occurring again? If war is political, 
Clausewitz fails to provide for situations where it is political not to engage in an unrestricted 
or limited war. In regards to these caveats, Clausewitz reminds us that the military must 
remain subservient to the political, even in war. These political ends therefore must be 
achieved, or at least have a possibility of being achieved, else there is no purpose to the war. 
Furthermore, restraint that causes a war to fall short of its objectives is truly absurd. So what 
is the alternative? 
In O’Donovan’s book, “The Just War Revisited”, war is conceived of as an 
“extraordinary extension of ordinary acts of judgement” (O'Donovan, O., 2003: 6). In 
essence, war is the ‘extraordinary’ way that states apply justice in an anarchic international 
system. It is ‘extraordinary’ in a variety of senses: firstly, it is ‘extraordinary’ in that it is the 
last resort, when ‘ordinary’ means of judgement have failed; second, it is ‘extraordinary’ in 
that it is judgement outside the states’ ‘ordinary’ sphere of authority (assuming the 
Westphalian concept of sovereignty); and thirdly, it is ‘extraordinary’ in that it is justice 
without recourse to “judicial inquisition” (O'Donovan, O., 2003: 19-20). Such a definition 
ensures that war remains the “exception” and not the norm, which Clausewitz’s definition 
fails to do. Furthermore, this definition provides strong limits on the causes and aims of war, 
also which Clausewitz’s definition fails to achieve. 
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In Good Conscience?  
Jus Ad Bellum and the Decision to make War 
Chapter 2 
 
This chapter consists of three main parts. The first part discusses the theoretical 
discord between jus ad bellum and asymmetric warfare. The second part looks at how war as 
justice affects jus ad bellum in an asymmetric context. This section will therefore aim to 
reconcile the puzzle of the discord between asymmetric war and just war theory. The final 
section is a discussion of the implications of such a reconception. Specifically, it will look at 
how asymmetric warfare will influence ideas like ‘just cause’, ‘proportionality’ and most 
importantly, ‘right authority’.  
Part 1: Providing the Context 
Jus Ad Bellum: The Justice of War 
Jus ad bellum is one of the most recognisable aspects of just war theory, especially 
because of its prominence in various international regimes that regulate conflict. The term jus 
ad bellum is attributed to Augustine who, writing in an era where the Christian standpoint 
was pacifist, realised that there had to be a serious discussion on the use of force in the 
context of increasing Christian participation in the Roman Empire, especially in its army. Jus 
ad bellum is a set of exceptions that differentiate ‘just war’ from the ‘crime of war’, or what 
Walzer calls “aggression” (Walzer, M., 2000: 51). Some considerations involved in jus ad 
bellum, like ‘legitimate authority’ and ‘right intention’, have their origins in antiquity, while 
others like ‘reasonable prospects for success’ are more recent.  
Jus ad bellum has a twofold approach: a retrospective and a prospective viewpoint. Of 
the seven criteria that make up jus ad bellum, it is interesting to note that only two of these 
criteria (just cause and right authority) are retrospective, while the majority of the criteria are 
prospective. This is important, as it means that there is a strong connection between jus ad 
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bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum, and that while these principles are analytically 
distinct, in practice they will overlap. Furthermore, jus ad bellum ensures that leaders have 
seriously thought through the decision, not just retrospectively, (whether the war is just 
because just cause and right authority have been satisfied), but have considered and planned 
prospectively: essentially forcing decision makers to consider jus in bello and jus post bellum 
before those principles actually come into effect.5  
The retrospective viewpoint analyses the lead up to the conflict. It has two parts: the 
first asks, “Is the cause just, and is it great enough to justify going to war over it?” The 
question of just cause looks at the reason for war, the injustice or wrong done, and is usually 
limited to self-defence, defence of others, restoration of peace, defence of rights or the 
punishment of wrongdoing (Bellamy, A. J., 2006: 122). Just cause also relates to the 
magnitude of the ‘wrong’ and whether the resort to war is an appropriate response to that 
‘wrong’. This ties closely to ‘proportionality of ends’, discussed below. The second part of 
the retrospective viewpoint is the question of right authority. Given that the cause is just, and 
war is the correct response, right authority asks whether the actor is the appropriate one to 
pursue justice and fight the war. Traditionally, this actor is only one who has no judicial 
superior, yet of late, more legitimacy has been given to non-state and sub-state actors. 
A majority of the jus ad bellum criteria are prospective, i.e., they look at the plans for 
the execution of the war, and the re-establishment of peace: implying that those who choose 
war as a means for justice must consider all aspects of the war (its inception, prosecution, and 
conclusion) before making the initial step. Considerations like ‘last resort’ and ‘proper 
                                                            
5 Another distinction that is made is by Bellamy, who suggests that there are three types of criteria in jus ad 
bellum: substantive, prudential, and procedural Bellamy, A. J., (2006), Just wars : from Cicero to Iraq, Polity 
Press: Cambridge.. The substantive criteria are mainly moral criteria, and form the bulk of jus ad bellum. 
Prudential criteria focus on the cost of the decision, and demonstrate the influence that realism has had on the 
theory. Finally, procedural criteria focus on the process of the decision, and tend to reflect the legal influences 
on the tradition. 
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declaration’ remain similar in both conventional and asymmetric scenarios, and ‘right 
intention’ is dependent on the definition of war (war as justice). It is ‘proportionality of ends’ 
and ‘reasonable prospects for success’ that provide the most interesting analysis for 
asymmetric warfare. Proportionality is tied to just cause, as the magnitude of the cause will 
determine whether war as a response is proportional. If in an asymmetric scenario civilian 
casualties are higher, then the cause for war must be greater that in a conventional scenario 
for it to remain proportional. Reasonable prospects demands that even if a cause be just, and 
war be a proportional response, a war can still be unjust if it is waged knowing that it cannot 
be won. It has two parts, looking at the chance of success, as well as the cost of success 
(Bellamy, A. J., 2006: 123).  
Jus Ad Bellum: A Moral Decision and its Consequences 
The nature of asymmetric warfare ensures that “civilians” are tied to the conflict. For 
this reason, considerations of “just cause” must factor in the cost to civilians. Furthermore, 
because the insurgent gains his support from the population, one must consider whether the 
cause is in fact just. If a war for the purpose of control of a specific area, say in a situation 
like Vietnam, Northern Ireland or Iraq, is fought against an insurgent who gains considerable 
support from the people, the ‘cause’ may no longer be just, as it is a war against a people, not 
against an army. It is therefore a war that should not be won because the insurgents have 
already won over the population, and are therefore the legitimate rulers of the people. Further 
action on behalf of the counterinsurgent is consequently (in the case of foreign forces) a war 
of aggression, or (in the case of local forces) a war of tyranny (Walzer, M., 2000: 194-195). 
However, conquest or control of an area is not always the aim of a counterinsurgency war: 
the 2006 Israel-Hizbollah War provides an example where the counterinsurgent was not 
aiming to control an area of land, but rather seeking to influence the actions of an actor. In 
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this way, just cause must look consequentially at the cost of influencing an actor in relation to 
the goals that it is trying to obtain to see if the cause is great enough to warrant the cost (in 
terms of casualties, and damage and destruction caused). 
Secondly, if civilian casualties are higher in an asymmetric conflict, then one must 
consider whether the cost is proportionate to the injustice done. O’Donovan suggests that the 
question of proportion has two parts, a reflexive, backward-looking perspective (retrospective 
proportion), and a forward-looking perspective (prospective proportion). Retrospective 
proportion is tied inextricably to just cause, and demands that a “truthful description of wrong 
done” be the determinant of the extent of action. ‘Prospective proportion’ is the term that is 
commonly referred to in this context, usually expressed in terms of the type of justice that it 
is trying to achieve. 
Conversely, counterinsurgency demands that increasing levels of brutality be 
employed as a means to limit the number of casualties that the counterinsurgent suffers. In a 
counterinsurgency, the state is reliant on its constituency to provide the resources to fight the 
war, requiring the acquiescence of the constituency to accept the loss of those resources 
(namely people). Moreover, the state will attempt to manipulate the “instrumental 
dependence” in order to limit the number of casualties it suffers through limiting the size of 
its counterinsurgency forces (Merom, G., 2003: 22). Yet this poses a problem: the state has 
fewer resources, and yet, is still required to achieve the same goals. The state has both a 
political and strategic motivation to use less discriminating methods of violence to overcome 
this problem. 
The purpose of counterinsurgency is to deprive the insurgent of their support base (the 
population), isolating and exposing them. This is achieved through such tactics as 
propaganda, coercion and fear (Merom, G., 2003: 38) retribution, curfews and other 
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restrictive measures (Deady, T. K., 2005: 66). The net effect of such tactics is that it becomes 
much more difficult for such a society to then return to the “normal” state of affairs after the 
conflict, and make the formal transition from war back to peace. Counterinsurgency aims 
specifically at achieving military victory, and the political strategies that are employed (the 
winning of hearts and minds) are designed for situations of occupation, and as such, have in 
mind pacification of the area and under new control. For example, the classic examples of 
hearts and minds strategies appear in the Philippines (1899-1902), Afghanistan (1979-1989), 
and Iraq (2003- ), all of which were situations of an incumbent wishing to gain control of an 
area under their occupation. This idea contrasts quite clearly with just war theory’s intention 
of (re-)establishing peace. 
Finally, the inherent difficulties and complexities of fighting an asymmetric war 
demand that the criteria of ‘reasonable prospects for success’ be given serious attention. 
“Success” is not merely a military term: it means more than ‘victory’, and as such, requires 
more than just the incapacitation of the adversary’s forces. Rather, it is a political term that is 
focused on establishing a stable peace. In a conventional scenario, this is theoretically much 
simpler as ones forces are demobilised, and the state makes the formal transition from war to 
peace: militarily, economically, and socially. However, in an insurgency context, 
counterinsurgency tactics involve the ‘civilian’ directly, and the ability to demobilise and 
return to the state of peace becomes much more difficult. ‘Reasonable prospects for success’ 
involves analysing, a priori, the tactics and strategy of the action (jus in bello), and the plans 
for establishing a stable peace (jus post bellum), and attempts to gauge whether this is 
feasible. Merom demonstrates that as the levels of brutality (arguably, unjust tactics) 
increase, the casualty levels (of the incumbent) decrease (Merom, G., 2003: 22, 42-43). 
Therefore, “reasonable prospects for success” will need to take into account the cost to the 
I n   G o o d   C o n s c i e n c e ?   P a g e  | 29 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Stephen McGuinness         200414325 
 
incumbent that is required to achieve stable peace, acknowledging the fact that brutality can 
help manage those costs. Unlike (recent) conventional wars, which are over in a matter of 
days or even weeks, counterinsurgency wars are a process that takes many years. Consider 
the aforementioned examples. The Philippines took three years, Afghanistan required ten 
(and was still unsuccessful), and Iraq is up to four years and still going. It is true that the most 
recent counterinsurgency war, Israel-Lebanon 2006, lasted only four weeks, but neither was it 
a success (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007), nor is either side ready to accept that the 
conflict is over, or the dispute resolved. As O’Donovan points out:  
The tragedy of internal conflicts fought by guerrilla methods is that they are unending. 
Neither side is capable of inflicting such damage on the other as to create a real and 
urgent will for settlement. (O'Donovan, O., 2003: 77) 
There has been some debate recently (in the post-Cold War period with the rise of 
many new sovereign entities) over who has the right to be an actor in the international realm. 
It is a question that challenges the legitimacy of insurgent actors: it asks whether they are to 
be treated with the same status as conventional soldiers, and whether their actions are acts of 
war or acts of crime. In a conventional scenario, those who were captured out of uniform 
were considered spies, and were therefore no longer considered to be protected under the 
Geneva Convention. 
The authority to declare war has always been defined by the classical just war 
theorists in terms of those who have no judicial superior (hence, extraordinary justice due to 
lack of judicial inquisition). In the case of sub-state actors, they may have authority to declare 
war because it is judgement on another’s actions outside the bounds of Westphalian 
sovereignty (extraordinary justice outside ordinary authority). On the other hand, however, if 
a sub-state actor is working within the state, then they have a judicial superior, and hence do 
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not have authority. Sub-state actors that do not have a judicial superior (i.e., “distinct political 
communities” or “anti-colonial actors”) are therefore not bound by this caveat. 
 Bellamy defines the influences on the just war tradition as being three sub-traditions 
(realism, positive law, and natural law), each arguing that ‘right authority’ has different 
meaning. According to the realist, only the state has this authority. In addition to the state, 
positive law adds an “anti-colonial non-state actor. In natural law however, it is a “defined 
political community” that has ‘right authority’ in addition to the state. This broadens the 
sphere for legitimate action even further than that of positive law, and would therefore 
include any non-state actor that has some political basis.  
Jus Ad Bellum: The Puzzle Revisited 
While jus ad bellum may not be in complete tension with asymmetric warfare, there 
are certain puzzles that differentiate it from conventional warfare and therefore require 
reconsideration.  Firstly, counterinsurgency aims at producing a military victory, and uses 
political strategies to achieve such, yet jus ad bellum demands that the intention of the action 
be justice and the re-establishment of peace be the end goal, in essence, that “the military 
goals be subject to political goals.”(O'Donovan, O., 2003: 59). One could argue that 
counterinsurgency is not designed to be a political tool, but a military one, and if this is the 
case, then the principles of jus ad bellum are needed as a supplement to, as well as an 
influence on, strategy. 
 Similarly, the prospective nature of jus ad bellum requires some consideration of the 
conduct of a counterinsurgency war be part of the decision making process. 
Counterinsurgency’s reliance on increasing levels of violence in the interest of expediency 
and home support, in conjunction with the increased ‘civilian’ involvement, means that in 
comparison to conventional warfare, counterinsurgency is more ‘brutal’, and less ‘moral’. If 
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this is the nature of a counterinsurgency war (assuming for the sake of simplicity that jus ad 
bellum and jus in Bello are independent), then the cause that requires justice must be more 
severe than in a conventional case if it is to be proportionate.  
If the intention is justice, and counterinsurgency is a proportionate response, the 
nature of counterinsurgency means that the possibility of achieving military victory, 
obtaining justice, and making the transition back to peace is incredibly difficult. If the 
military victory cannot be prudently achieved, or if the obtaining of peace has poor prospects, 
then such a war is inherently unjust. If the authority to declare war is given to those who have 
no judicial superior, then the legitimacy of sub-state actors is called into question, and jus ad 
bellum arguably ceases to apply. 
Part 2: Formulating a Response 
Jus Ad Bellum: War as Justice 
 As mentioned earlier, defining war as “an extraordinary extension of ordinary means 
of judgment” provides a better structure for framing the just war in the context of 
counterinsurgency. In fact, this is precisely what jus ad bellum calls for. O’Donovan’s 
comment that war is extraordinary justice because ordinary means of justice have failed 
remains constant in the context of either conventional or asymmetric conflicts. However, war 
as extraordinary in terms of authority provides a useful perspective in the context of 
asymmetric conflict.  
 If war is an act of judgement, then it can only be proportionate to the wrong incurred. 
Thus, the extent of the wrong will determine the extent of the justice. Inherent in the concept 
of justice are two considerations. Firstly, that there be restorative justice, in that the wrong is 
righted. In the case of an act of aggression (Hizbollah’s abduction of soldiers), restorative 
justice ensures that the responding action is restore the status quo (the safe return of abducted 
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soldiers). This type of justice requires constant re-evaluation, as it involves a retrospective 
aspect (what is an objective account of the wrong done), and a prospective aspect (are we at 
the point where we have righted the wrong and restored a state justice). The second type of 
justice is punitive, in that it ensures that the wrongdoers are punished for their acts, and that 
they serve as a deterrent for others. In this way, proportion needs to be in regards to the extent 
that is required to serve as a genuine punishment and deterrent. 
If war is an act of judgement, then it must ensure that justice is actually achieved, or 
seen to be achievable and feasible. Worse than useless, a war that is waged despite the fact 
that it cannot achieve justice is itself morally reprehensible, no matter how just the cause. A 
failed war not only means that people have died “in vain”, but the original wrong that caused 
the war has not been righted, and the resulting “peace” is actually more unjust that the 
situation before the war. In asymmetric warfare, the difficult and “unending” nature of the 
war means that the prospects for achieving justice are lower. If war is justice, then the means 
of justice must be proportionate to the cause, otherwise the means themselves become unjust. 
Asymmetric warfare’s brutal nature risks becoming a disproportionate response to the 
original wrong.  
Part 3: Exploring the Consequences 
Jus Ad Bellum: ‘Proportionality’, ‘Just Cause’ and the Problem of Going to War 
There are two problems: firstly, the population of southern Lebanon is invariably tied 
to Hizbollah, and any action will involve the civil population, as discussed earlier. In the 
Second Lebanon War, there were at least 1,000 Lebanese killed, a majority of them 
“civilians” (Myre, G., 2006). The second problem is that if the population of southern 
Lebanon genuinely support Hizbollah, then the question of just cause is raised. Myre points 
out that “[Hizbollah]’s military preparations from 2000 till 2006 took place in [civilian] areas. 
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They were of course done with complete secrecy, but in accordance with the civilians” 
(Myre, G., 2006). The author of an Israeli report on the use of civilian “human shields” by 
Hizbollah argues that “Hezbollah was operating inside a supportive population, and cynically 
used them to further its own goals”(Myre, G., 2006).  
War as justice must overcome this problem: on the one hand, it must acknowledge 
that in acts of aggression, the injustice must be overcome in order for a just peace to be 
achieved; on the other hand, the act of achieving justice itself must remain just and to do so, 
must remain proportionate and discriminate. Asymmetric warfare must therefore change the 
definition of those who are immune to suit the ‘soldier-civilian’ dynamic. By definition, if the 
population is connected to the insurgent, and is supportive of it, then this may implicate the 
“civilian” as being culpable of that same aggression, and civilians would therefore lose their 
“immune” status. Even so, states still go out of their way to minimise this type of casualty: 
Israel made sure that numerous steps were taken to ensure that civilians were warned about 
upcoming attacks, through pamphlets and phone calls to specific houses (Erlich, R., 2006: 
272-274). 
Jus Ad Bellum: ‘Right Authority’ and its Extraordinary Extension 
 Who has the right to declare war? The case of Hizbollah does not fit neatly into any 
of the categories provided for in just war theory (state, anti-colonial actor, or defined political 
community). Despite many claims, Hizbollah is not a separate political entity within 
Lebanon: specifically, it is not, nor does it attempt to replace, the Lebanese Government. So 
therefore it is not the state. Neither is it an ‘anti-colonial non-state actor’, as Lebanon is no 
longer a colony, having gained its independence during the 1940s: the clearest claim for a 
controlling colonial power in Lebanon would probably be Syria, whom Hizbollah seems to 
support, or gain support from. Finally, there is the question of whether Hizbollah is a ‘defined 
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political community’. While Hizbollah is a political actor, in that is has the support of many 
Shi’a in south Lebanon and fulfils many political responsibilities, the recent war in 2006 was 
a case of the organisation carrying out its own “foreign policy” without the acquiescence of 
the Lebanese government (Paraipan, M., 2007b). Yet Hizbollah still acknowledges the state 
of Lebanon as being judicially superior. As Hizbollah is a political party, and has maintained 
its stance that it does not wish to replace the existing Lebanese government, the question of 
Hizbollah’s authority to declare war on Israel is called into question. More specifically, if the 
Lebanese government is declaring itself the official “resistance against Israel”, as Minister for 
Information Ghazi Aridi describes it, then the legitimacy for Hizbollah to also be a front 
against Israel is further weakened (Paraipan, M., 2007a). 
The fact that it represents a community is the key to this particular case. Working on 
the presumption that Lebanon is a weak state that fails to provide many of the functions of a 
government, especially in the south, Hizbollah’s role as a service provider in the absence of 
the state means that they are more than a political party. Especially in the case of 
insurgencies, where the insurgent and the population are interconnected, this provision of 
services is increasingly important as it means that less coercion is required to gain popular 
support. Myre, in interviewing a Lebanese General, argues  
You cannot separate the southern society from Hezbollah, because Hezbollah is the 
society and the society is Hezbollah. Hezbollah is holding this society together through its 
political, military and economic services. It is providing the welfare for the south. (Myre, 
G., 2006) 
 In the aftermath of the 2006 war, Hizbollah members went out through the war-affected area, 
cataloguing destroyed houses and shops, and subsequently providing rent to those affected: 
up to $12,000 per family (Abdul-Ahad, G., 2007). 
In this context, the support given by the population to Hizbollah means that Hizbollah 
has some authority in being able to declare war. The “representativeness” of Hizbollah for the 
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community in southern Lebanon is akin to the “representativeness” of the conventional 
soldier to the state. Yet there is another incentive for this. Given that Hizbollah is now 
responsible for the welfare of the people in the southern Lebanon, and the fact that Hizbollah 
believes that the government of Lebanon is ineffective in its ability to deal with Israel, it is 
foreseeable that Hizbollah will continue to act “without authority”. This implication is 
important, as it means that Hizbollah will continue to be treated by others as criminals or 
terrorists, and will continue to act without being bound by the principles of jus ad bellum.  
Specifically, right authority has been the mainstay of jus ad bellum thinking, and it is 
only in the modern period that legitimacy in some form has been given to non-state actors. 
O’Donovan’s conception of war as an extraordinary extension of ordinary means of justice, 
especially in the sense that it is outside the traditional Westphalian idea of authority, means 
that non-state actors may have the ability to legitimately make war. Importantly, there are 
good normative grounds for doing so. By allowing for non-state actors to legitimately make 
war, i.e. by giving them “right authority”, the demands of jus ad bellum become applicable to 
them. In providing non-state actors “authority” to make war, many may see this as giving 
them a justification for war, which they previously did not have, however, in a practical 
sense, this may in fact place more restrictions on their existing actions, making them 
accountable for their aggression. The “representativeness” of the insurgent group in relation 
to their population will be tested by their declaration of war, and thus reinforce their 
legitimacy or remove it. In regards to the war as a whole, by giving non-state actors the 
authority to make war (which they currently do without such authority) the principles of jus 
in bello and jus post bellum come into effect, and further restrict the activity of war.  
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Conclusion 
Jus ad bellum is one of the oldest principles in just war theory, and has undergone 
extensive redevelopment over the past two thousand years in an attempt to address various 
issues. War is defined as justice, specifically as an “extraordinary extension of ordinary 
means of justice”, and must in its intension seek to right the wrong (that just cause), and 
restore peace. Consequently, three problems arise specific to asymmetric war. Firstly, the 
interconnectedness between the insurgent and the population means that a higher proportion 
of civilian casualties must be considered as part of the decision to go to war. As such, for an 
asymmetric war to remain as a proportionate end, its cause must be greater than in a 
conventional war. The difficulty of asymmetric war in general means that the probability of 
obtaining justice (the prospects for success) is lessened and subsequent actions can compound 
the problem. War as extraordinary justice means that non-state actors (the insurgent) can 
actually have the ‘right authority’ accorded to them through their ‘representative’ status vis-à-
vis the population.  
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Defining the Limits  
Jus in Bello and the Conduct of War 
Chapter 3 
 
The first part of this chapter will define the principle of jus in bello, and how this 
conflicts with asymmetric warfare. This part describes jus in bello as a principle that aims to 
limit the conduct of war, by ensuring that it remains proportionate and that it is discriminate: 
i.e., that the measures that are used are the minimum necessary to achieve its objectives, and 
that those measures discriminate between those who are targets, and those who are immune. 
Following is an account of counterinsurgency warfare that shows how the ideas of 
proportionality and discrimination can be impractical. Section two defines those who are not 
immune as those who are guilty of “direct material cooperation in the doing of harm”, a 
definition which builds on O’Donovan’s idea of war as justice as developed in the previous 
chapter. The final section will then look at three particular issues that are raised in the 
conduct of counterinsurgency, namely finding the balance between moral restraint and 
military prudence, the legitimacy of the insurgent and the subsequent use of “special 
measures” by the counterinsurgent, and the idea of “playing by the rules” when the other side 
does not. 
Part 1: Providing the Context 
Jus In Bello: The Justice in War 
The second pillar of modern just war theory is jus in bello, the justice in war. While it 
may seem obvious that one’s conduct in a conflict would reflect on its overall ‘justness’, this 
was not the case for the early just war thinkers. Early just war writers like Cicero and 
Augustine predominantly focused on jus ad bellum, and criteria like just cause and right 
authority. While the works of Gratian and especially Aquinas made some progress towards 
limiting the brutal nature of medieval conflict, it was not until the sixteenth, with the work of 
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Vitoria and the questioning of the objectivity of justice that jus in bello became increasingly 
prominent. The effect was that if jus ad bellum could no longer be defined objectively, then 
jus in bello became especially important. Yet it was not until the modern age that the jus in 
bello principles of discrimination and proportionality were given substance. 
Discrimination requires that soldiers in a conflict make realistic attempts to 
distinguish between those who are legitimate targets and those who are not. Central to this 
criterion is the concept of non-combatant immunity. One of the earliest statements of this 
principle was by the “Peace of God” movement of the 11th century, which forbade “all acts of 
warfare or vengeance against clerics, pilgrims, merchants, Jews, women and peasants…” 
(Bellamy, A. J., 2006: 31). In the 13th century, Aquinas developed one of the most important 
aspects of the criterion of discrimination, that of “double effect”. The principle of “double 
effect” suggests that any act may have two consequences, one intended, and one unintended; 
even if the intention of the act is ‘good’, there is the possibility that the unintended effect may 
be ‘bad’. Aquinas argues:  
Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the 
other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is 
intended, not from what is beside the intention, since this is accidental…And yet, though 
preceding from good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion 
to the end… (Bellamy, A. J., 2006: 38). 
This leads to the second criteria of jus in bello, that the tactics and methods of the war 
be in proportion to the ends sought. This criterion asks whether the tactics and military goals 
of the conflict are required or necessary to achieve the ends of the conflict as a whole. It 
weighs the consequences of the actions against the aims of that action. The oft-cited example 
is General Sherman’s siege of Atlanta during the American civil war. Sherman’s defence for 
his shelling of residential areas was that it was a military necessity (Bellamy, A. J., 2006: 92), 
(Walzer, M., 2000: 32-33). Yet the question is often asked of whether this tactic was really a 
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necessity in order to pacify the population of Atlanta, or whether it was just expedient. 
Within the concept of proportionality (and sometimes referred to as the third criteria of jus in 
bello) is the idea of restriction of specific conduct and weapons. It refers to the banning of 
weapons which are inherently cruel (weapons that go beyond the minimum means necessary 
to achieve objectives, like hollow-point bullets), or indiscriminate (like weapons of mass 
destruction, be they biological, chemical or nuclear), and similar tactics (such as scorched 
earth policies). 
Jus In Bello: A Moral Conduct 
Within the principle of jus in bello, the criterion of discrimination focuses on ‘who is 
the target in warfare’. While such a statement6 at first glance seems straightforward, (and 
those who hold to ‘military necessity’ argue that it is), the definition of targets is difficult to 
answer, and is the subject of numerous theoretical debates. However, international positive 
law does provide some guidance on the issue, having codified the definition of civilians in 
various articles and regimes.7  
The question of discrimination is not a problem only for insurgency warfare. As 
Walzer points out, “…soldiers could probably not fight at all, except in the desert and at sea, 
without endangering nearby civilians” (Walzer, M., 2000: 153). The idea of “double effect” 
is but one answer to this problem that the just war theorists put forth. However, Walzer 
argues that merely having ‘good’ intentions is not enough, but there must be a “double 
                                                            
6 Walzer defines the problem in terms of ‘permissibility’, in that it is a question that defines who may be 
permissibly targeted, and who should remain immune. This definition, Walzer argues, is a complex process 
that requires the balance of the pressure of morality against the pressure of ‘military necessity’. Walzer, M., 
(2000), Just and unjust wars : a moral argument with historical illustrations, Basic Books: New York. 
7 International regimes, like the Fourth Geneva Convention, are particularly useful, in that they not only 
provide definitions of “civilian”, but also provide a framework for their treatment in times of war. I.C.R.C., 
(1949), "International Humanitarian Law ‐ Fourth 1949 Geneva Convention", 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/380?OpenDocument, (5/5/07). 
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intention”: “…first, that the “good” be achieved; second that the foreseeable evil be reduced 
as far as possible” (Walzer, M., 2000: 155). He elaborates: 
The intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims narrowly at the acceptable effect; the 
evil is not one of his ends, and, aware of the evil involved, he seeks to minimise it, 
accepting costs to himself (Walzer, M., 2000: 155). 
In other words, “double intention” seeks more than just proportionality, in that it demands 
that the actor make a “positive commitment to save civilian lives”, as well as the application 
of the “proportionality rule and kill no more civilians that is militarily necessary…” (Walzer, 
M., 2000: 155-6). Often, this is second part of the double intention doctrine is called “due 
care”, and is a significant part of both Walzer’s and international laws conception of jus in 
bello. 
Military Necessity and the ‘Special Measures’ of Counter-Insurgency 
Counterinsurgency by way of contrast requires that civilians be targeted in one way or 
another, hence directly violating the principle of non-combatant immunity. By definition, 
insurgents overcome the power deficit by disguising themselves as civilians, and hiding their 
‘guilt’. Furthermore, insurgents will deliberately place civilians in harm’s way to exploit the 
propaganda value of civilian casualties (O'Donovan, O., 2003: 64). To use Mao’s metaphor, 
insurgents are the fish in the sea of the population. In this sense, the civilians are more than 
the insurgents’ “hostage shield”, they are the insurgents’ support network (Deady, T. K., 
2005: 58).  
The “military necessity’ of counterinsurgency involves the targeting of civilians, 
firstly, by accident (the accidental effect of Aquinas’ “double effect”), but secondly by 
strategy (in an attempt to get to the insurgent and neutralise him). In the case of the former, 
the proximity, both physically and strategically, between the civilian and the insurgent means 
that the counterinsurgent will inevitably target a civilian in an attempt to reach the insurgent. 
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From a military perspective, this “collateral damage” is simply the reality of war and cannot 
be helped. The latter, however, is an important part of counterinsurgency, and is arguably part 
of the analytical distinction between asymmetric and conventional war. The counterinsurgent 
may specifically target a civilian for one of two reasons. Firstly, if the civilian is directly 
assisting an insurgent, then targeting may be in the form of direct attack (say, the arrest – and 
possible execution – of individuals) or more benign methods (like the isolation of the village 
through curfews occupation or “strategic fortified hamlets”). Direct targeting can also take 
the form of retribution. The use of terror and coercive tactics in response to cooperation with 
insurgents is but another way of dissuading the population from cooperation. Secondly, the 
counterinsurgent may target entire peoples, whether or not they are specifically responsible. 
Benevolently, this tactic takes the form of ‘hearts and minds’ policies, which aim at gaining 
the support of the population through propaganda, or less benign methods, like cultural 
annihilation (Merom, G., 2003: 37).  
Jus In Bello: The Puzzle Revisited 
Herein lies the difficulty: by definition, just war theory demands that discrimination 
between ‘combatant’ and ‘non-combatant’ be observed, yet at the same time, insurgency 
demands using the population, even at their expense, and counter-insurgency demands high 
levels of brutality in order to limit casualties incurred. As O’Donovan explains, “the 
insurgent makes his [point] by forcing his opponent to slaughter the innocent unintentionally” 
(O'Donovan, O., 2003: 64). The just war ‘solution’, Walzer’s “double intention”, is 
insufficient, in that even the example he uses to illustrate his idea is on the conventional 
battlefield, with soldiers in uniform, and civilians hiding in basements set apart from the 
combatant. Simply importing Walzer’s development of ‘double effect’ so that it includes 
‘double intention’ is untenable, due to the fact that minimising the costs involved to the 
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counter-insurgent at cost to himself would lead to a militarily impractical solution, and one 
that will “offer very little by way of restraints on the conduct of war” (Bellamy, A. J., 2005: 
281). The aim, therefore, is to provide a way of firstly distinguishing the ‘targets’ in counter-
insurgency, and secondly, to identify the scope of actions available to the counter-insurgent. 
Part 2: Formulating a Response 
Jus In Bello: War as Justice 
By conceiving war as ‘extraordinary judgement’, defining legitimate targets becomes 
slightly easier, in that it becomes a matter of defining who is ‘guilty’ and who is ‘innocent’. 
Defining targets in this way overcomes problematic terms such as ‘civilian’ or ‘soldier’, and 
‘combatant’ or ‘non-combatant’. O’Donovan defines “guilt” as the “direct material co-
operation in the doing of wrong”: in other words, it defines targets based on their “practical 
engagement in an act that will wrong others” (O'Donovan, O., 2003: 36). As it is the state that 
is ultimately responsible for the decision to go to war, it is therefore the state that decides 
who is ‘guilty’ and who is ‘innocent’. 
In an insurgency, the use of ‘guilt’ as opposed to ‘combatant’ for defining targets 
provides a more practical distinction, as a ‘non-combatant’ may still be providing “direct 
material co-operation in the doing of wrong”. The use of ‘guilt’ is similar, yet broader, to the 
concept of ‘threat’. Both place the counter-insurgent in some form of danger, yet ‘threat’ 
places the counter-insurgent in immediate danger (a real and imminent chance of harm), 
while ‘guilt’ encompasses indirect danger. In this sense, ‘indirect danger’ is a situation that 
would assist those who would place the counter-insurgent in immediate danger. In an 
insurgency, the consequences of such a definition are that those who in a conventional sense 
would be classed as ‘civilians’ (and therefore inviolate), are legitimately targeted. For 
example, O’Donovan argues that a “mechanic, a politician, a computer operator and a driver” 
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would all be classed as non-combatants, as they are not immediate threats. However, they 
may be in positions that can be defined as indirectly dangerous to counter-insurgents, and 
therefore lose their ‘immune’ status (O'Donovan, O., 2003). However, Walzer makes that 
point that even thought a target is ‘guilty’ by O’Donovan’s definition, it does not mean that 
they need to be killed. Acts of restrain in this sense “are acts of kindness… they may be 
likened to supererogatory acts. Not that they involve doing more than is morally required; 
they involve doing less than is permitted” (Walzer, M., 2000). 
Jus In Bello: Culpability and Agency 
Classifying ‘targets’ as either “guilty” or “innocent” has problems, due to the use of 
value-laden terms in the definition. In an anarchic international system, there is no power to 
arbitrate between the sides, and therefore, no power to assign ‘guilt’ or ‘innocence’ other than 
the protagonists themselves: for this reason, war is considered an ostensible justice. The 
definition then, of providing “direct material co-operation in the doing of wrong” is 
unsatisfactory, in the sense that it is difficult to determine “wrong”, and therefore, no way to 
define who is ‘guilty’. Furthermore, an insurgency becomes even more difficult to determine 
“guilt” in situations where there exist insurgents (deliberately disguised as ‘civilians’ to hide 
their guilt), supporters of the insurgency, and those who are being used as “hostage shields” 
by the insurgents. This raises the question of collective and individual guilt, as a single 
person may be specifically guilty of a particular action, yet a community may be collectively 
guilty as well. Hence, there are different types of guilt as well, and this further complicates 
the issue. 
However, an actors’ ‘culpability’ can be found in the “direct material co-operation” in 
the doing of harm, not the “doing of wrong” as O’Donovan suggests. Adapting O’Donovan’s 
definition, targets are those who are involved in the ‘practical engagement in an act that will 
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harm others’. In this sense, harm is value-neutral, and therefore more suitable than “wrong”. 
Furthermore, harm is a term that has varying levels, and as such, provides a better 
determinant for cases of individual versus collective guilt. Israel’s strategy of precision 
strikes on Hamas or Hizbollah ‘bomb-makers’ would arguably be inappropriate if applied to 
whole villages because of the harm caused. Guilt based on harm provides a better distinction, 
and therefore better responses. 
Part 3: Exploring the Consequences 
Jus In Bello: Moral Restraint Or Military Prudence 
The most fundamental problem with counterinsurgency is the ability to balance 
‘military prudence’ with ‘moral restraint’; it is a question of the overall limits of action. 
O’Donovan makes this problem clear when he asks “how [can a] counterinsurgency force… 
operate effectively while maintaining a respect for discrimination which insurgency does not 
share?” (O'Donovan, O., 2003: 64). Merom suggests, “violence is not only the primary means 
of getting the desired results of war. Rather, it is also a way of managing its costs” (Merom, 
G., 2003: 42). In other words, indiscriminate (and therefore higher levels of) violence is the 
most militarily expedient option, yet ‘surgical’ violence, (while supposedly more moral) will 
lead to increased casualties.  
In the literature on counterinsurgency, the theme of “isolation” is repeated.8 In other 
words, ‘isolation’ is where the counterinsurgent targets the population that supports the 
insurgency, and aims to isolate them. It involves two dimensions, physical and psychological. 
Physical isolation is achieved through the depriving the insurgent of access to the population, 
                                                            
8 The terms “annihilation”, “isolation” and “eradication” are taken from Merom’s book as three analytical 
strategies that are in practice, often conflated or used successively. In regards to the “isolation” strategy, it is 
often akin to “winning hearts and minds” Shafer, D. M., (1988), "The Unlearned Lessons of 
Counterinsurgency", Political Science Quaterly, 103:1 57‐80., or “attraction and chastisement” Deady, T. K., 
(2005), "Lessons from a Successful Counter‐Insurgency: The Philippines, 1899‐1902", Parameters, 35:1 53‐68.. 
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and hampering their movement (which is key to their military strategy). Psychological 
isolation aims to drive an ideological wedge between the insurgent and the population such 
that the population no longer wishes to support the insurgent. Furthermore, isolation can have 
both benevolent and brutal extremes. At one end of the “spectrum” brutal isolation involves, 
in the physical dimension, the indiscriminate bombing of villages or ‘civilian’ populations, 
terror and coercive tactics, and destruction of property as retribution for cooperation, and in 
the psychological dimension, the destruction of the culture (or the national identity) of the 
population. At the other end of the “spectrum” benevolent isolation includes the “hearts and 
minds” policy, usually achieved through propaganda, or what the US currently terms “public 
diplomacy”(Beehner, L., 2005). Physically, isolation is done through the use of concentration 
camps (like those used by the British in the Boer War), fortified strategic hamlets (used by 
the US in Vietnam), and the use of checkpoints, curfews and neighbourhood cordons (Deady, 
T. K., 2005: 66). It is important to note that these differences are purely analytical, in that 
physical and psychological isolation are used complementarily, and the ‘brutal’/‘benevolent’ 
divide can be both complementary or sequential (Merom, G., 2003: 38). For example, Deady 
comments, 
Civic action and benevolent treatment alone were unable to win the Philippine campaign. 
Armed only with good deeds, soldiers were unable to either protect Filipino supporters 
from retribution or deny support to the insurgents. It was only with the addition of the 
chastisement tools... that soldiers were able to separate guerrillas from their support. 
(Deady, T. K., 2005: 66) 
While isolation is not necessarily an end in itself, as it should invariably lead to the exposure 
of the insurgents and therefore to “their destruction, or at least their neutralisation” (Pustay, J. 
S., 1965: 83), it seems to have problems with the definitions of discrimination. The aim of 
discrimination is to provide distinction between the “culpable” and the “immune”, yet by 
definition, isolation involves whole villages, cities, peoples, and is therefore indiscriminate. 
Walzer suggests that a dual strategy is required. In areas where support for the insurgent is 
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minimal or moderate, a strategy of “winning hearts and minds” through political and police-
type tactics is preferable. Alternatively, in areas where insurgent support is high, then a more 
conventional approach is required, surrounded and attacked in force whereby the principle of 
‘double intention’ can be brought into effect (Walzer, M., 2000: 194). In the former situation, 
isolation takes the form of an ideological split between insurgents and their supporters, in the 
latter, the soldiers (if “properly prepared and equipped”) “need not accept unbearable risks in 
fighting… [and] need not inflict indiscriminate destruction” (Walzer, M., 2000: 194). He 
points out, however, that the conventional approach needs to be followed by the ‘winning of 
hearts and minds’. 
Jus In Bello: Legitimacy and the Use of Special Measures 
Another crucial debate in counterinsurgency has been the status of the insurgent 
according to international law. If the insurgent is not a legitimate wielder of coercive power, 
(the traditional province of the state), then the insurgent loses his “war rights” under the war 
convention, and is therefore subject to the “special measures” of the counterinsurgent 
(Walzer, M., 2000: 182). According to the Article 37 of the Additional Protocol of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, it is prohibited to feign a civilian or non-combatant (I.C.R.C, 1977). 
Furthermore, Article 44 states that a combatant must carry, 
…his arms openly: 
(a) during each military engagement, and 
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military 
deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate. (I.C.R.C, 1977) 
Walzer points out that the use of civilian clothing as a ruse and a disguise is a key moral 
problem, in that it violates the “implicit trust upon which the war convention rests: soldiers 
must feel safe among civilians if civilians are ever to be safe from soldiers” (Walzer, M., 
2000: 182-183). Accordingly, Walzer argues that in situations where guerrillas use this 
deception to attack soldiers, such acts are not acts of war, but acts of assassination. As such, 
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“…assassins cannot claim the protection of the rules of war; they are engaged in a different 
activity” (Walzer, M., 2000: 183). 
If asymmetric warfare is assassination and not warfare in the strictest sense, how does 
this affect the actors’ status and treatment? Specifically, does this problem allow the 
counterinsurgent to employ ‘special measures’, and act outside the Geneva Conventions? It is 
quite clear that the US, as the case of Guantanamo Bay suggests, does believe that because 
the combatants were not in uniform, they are not covered under the Geneva Convention 
(Tully, A., 2006).  
However, such a position does not serve to limit conflict, and can serve to worsen it if 
the insurgent believes they are not being taken seriously. Walzer suggests “…guerrillas are 
protected by the civilians among whom they stand” because of their ‘representativeness’. 
Assuming the popular support is voluntary, just as soldiers acquire “war rights” in the service 
of their population, so too guerrillas gain those same rights. Therefore, if the support of the 
population is non-existent, then so too are the guerrilla’s “war rights”, and the insurgent loses 
his legitimacy (Walzer, M., 2000: 185). In this case, the response by the US would seem 
justified, as the insurgent becomes little different to a criminal. By way of objection, what if 
the support of the population is gained through the use of terror and coercion (Merom, G., 
2003: 40)? In response, Walzer explains that “if [the] killing of civilians were sufficient to 
win civilian support, the guerrillas would always be at a disadvantage, for their enemies 
possess far more fire power than they do” (Walzer, M., 2000: 184-185).  
O’Donovan takes a similar line, in that he too sees the problem of conceiving 
insurgents as criminals, and likewise aims to provide them with some legitimacy. He suggests 
that providing incentives to insurgents would help to persuade them to observe limits on 
warfare, especially in regards to discrimination (O'Donovan, O., 2003: 65). He argues that 
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international law has progressively made changes to the status of “irregular” forces to include 
insurgents, “with the idea of tempting such movements to sign up to international norms of 
conduct” (O'Donovan, O., 2003: 66).  His solution is to bring insurgency more in line with 
conventional warfare, and in return, ensure that the rights of insurgents are provided as war 
prisoners, not criminals. 
Jus In Bello: Reciprocity and “Playing by the Rules” 
In O’Donovan’s analysis of just war theory and counterinsurgency, he says there are 
two questions that arise from the use of the civilian population as a “hostage shield” by the 
insurgents. The first question of discrimination has already been mentioned at the start of this 
Part. The second question is “…can the conduct of counterinsurgency be conducted in such a 
way as to persuade insurgents to abide by the principle of discrimination?” (O'Donovan, O., 
2003: 64). This question I cannot answer, but it raises the point: if the insurgent refuses to 
‘play by the rules’, what impact does this have on the counterinsurgent?   
Thus far, the imperative has been on the counterinsurgent to moderate his conduct, but 
what happens in situations where the insurgent is fighting the war unjustly? The recent war in 
Lebanon provides a clear example. The spark that started the war was the abduction of two 
Israeli soldiers by Hizbollah on July 12, 2006. However, Article 34 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention specifically states that the taking of hostages is prohibited (I.C.R.C., 1949). It can 
be argued that as the soldiers were reservists on patrol on the Israeli side of the Israel-
Lebanon border, this is a case of abduction, not the capture of prisoners of war9. The point, 
therefore, is if the other side violates the rules of war (and therefore fights an unjust war), 
does that give the right for the counterinsurgent to do the same? 
                                                            
9 In light of the little information provided by Hizbollah about the condition of the prisoners, implying that they 
are not treated as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention, it is possible to speculate that their situation 
reflects a hostage situation, not a war prisoner’s situation. 
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Reciprocity aims for the limiting of war, and is therefore important, even if at times it 
seems as though one side is played for a ‘sucker’. It is possible that reciprocity could have the 
opposite effect, as a violation of discrimination could lead to a ‘tit-for-tat’ scenario that 
worsens a conflict rather than limits it. It is the first step in ensuring restraint on the part of 
the protagonists, which has been the purpose of the just war tradition. As O’Donovan points 
out, “… every step towards restraint gains some ground for the civilising of armed conflict” 
(O'Donovan, O., 2003: 65). Secondly, ignoring the rules invalidates the just war tradition 
altogether, proving it  ineffective and therefore useless, and as a result, removing the moral 
restraints on war. As Bellamy argues,  
…that rule-breaking and unjust behaviour in the name of necessity will encourage our 
adversaries to use similar tactics and leave us without a common moral language to 
evaluate the justness or otherwise of such actions. (Bellamy, A. J., 2005: 278) 
In short, the result would be either increasing levels in brutality with little or no restraint, or 
the lack of legitimacy of the counterinsurgent in the eyes of the population.10 This is difficult 
to manage, because behind asymmetric military strategies is the great asymmetry of power. 
However, this is not impossible to achieve, as there will be the gradual move toward peace, 
and on the part of the insurgent, the move to more ‘moderate’ tactics as a result of 
compromise with the counterinsurgent. 
Conclusion 
Reiterating the point made earlier in this chapter, the imperative is to limit the conduct 
war as far as possible. In the case of asymmetric warfare, it is doubly necessary as the 
conflict inherently involves a civil population. Particularly, two issues were covered. Firstly, 
this chapter explored the definition of discrimination in counterinsurgency, highlighting the 
                                                            
10 The violations of discrimination by the counterinsurgent, while at the same time, their demands for 
insurgent to observe those same principles have a twofold effect. It means that the counterinsurgent is acting 
hypocritically, and therefore morally reprehensible, and also, it means that that as a result, the task of isolating 
the insurgent from the population that much more difficult. 
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difficulties experienced because of the seemingly opposing natures of counterinsurgency and 
just war theory. Specifically, defining “culpability” in terms of “direct material co-operation 
in the doing of harm” is a definition that builds on the work of O’Donovan, but avoids the use 
of value-laden terms, which make the definition difficult to use in practice. Secondly, it 
covered three “puzzles” which dominate discussions of how a counterinsurgency is fought. 
The first puzzle showed that there is a need for balance between strategies of “military 
prudence” and “moral restraint”, concluding that the balance is found in a mixture of 
“isolation” and “eradication” techniques that use the principle of “double intention” as 
described by Walzer. The second puzzle demonstrated that the unique nature of insurgency 
needs to be considered, and provisions made so as to allow the insurgents legitimate status, 
and therefore hopefully hold them accountable to the rules of war. The third puzzle 
demonstrated that despite what seems to be the unjust conduct of the insurgent in the 
conventional sense, there is a real need to “play by the rules” and force the insurgent to 
reciprocate. 
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All’s Well That Ends Well? 
Jus Post Bellum and the Conclusion of War 
Chapter 4 
 
This chapter aims to build upon the previous two by showing that the themes of 
discrimination and proportionality must be carried through to the end of the war, and the 
development of a post-war settlement. This chapter will begin with an introduction to jus post 
bellum and the creation of a just peace. Being one of the most recent developments in just 
war theory, this section is relatively extensive in order to provide an account of what jus post 
bellum is. Following is an analysis of how the effects of asymmetric warfare can inhibit jus 
post bellum. Section two will discuss how war as justice will define guilt and therefore carry 
through the theme of proportionality and discrimination. Key to this section is the idea that as 
the insurgent is ‘representative’ of the population that they are connected to, guilt is similarly 
distributed in a democratic ‘civil society’ because of the behaviour of its leaders. Finally, the 
implications of this are discussed through attempts to resolve three puzzles: the question of 
guilt in post-war settlements, the problem of compensation and the establishment of post-war 
order, and the puzzle of war-crimes tribunals. Specifically, I wish to consider the place of war 
crimes tribunals in counterinsurgency by asking two main questions: do war crimes tribunal 
help or hinder the establishment of a just peace in an insurgency scenario, and secondly, are 
war crimes tribunals a suitable institution to deal with the guilt of a people, as opposed to an 
individual? 
Part 1: Providing the Context 
Jus Post Bellum: The Justice After War 
“Three periods must be distinguished with respect to every war: its inception, its 
prosecution, and the period after victory” writes Francisco Suarez, the sixteenth century 
Spanish theologian, and one of the most influential writers on international law. The idea of a 
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“just peace”, of justice after the hostilities of war have ceased, is therefore not new, though it 
has only been recently that it has been considered as part of the just war tradition. There are 
two main reasons for this: firstly, the growth of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping 
has raised the awareness of returning a state to a stable peace after the conclusion of military 
operations, the second being the increasing acknowledgement of an individual’s 
accountability for their actions in conflict.  
Yet what is it that jus post bellum demands? It is more than just the status quo ante 
bellum, the state of affairs before the conflict. As Walzer points out, “…one ought not to aim 
for the literal restoration of the status quo ante bellum because that situation was precisely 
what led to war in the first place…” (Orend, B., 2002: 45). When considering this question, 
the ends of jus post bellum stand in relation to the goals sought after by jus ad bellum, and in 
relation to the means (jus in bello) required to achieve those goals. Importantly, Walzer 
argues that the end goal should be a  
“…‘better state of peace’. And better, within the confines of the argument for justice, 
means more secure than the status quo ante bellum, less vulnerable to territorial 
expansion, safer for ordinary men and women, and for their domestic self-
determinations.” (Walzer, M., 2000: 121-122). 
So on the one hand, jus post bellum is about ends. It focuses on the condition that the state is 
in after the conflict. However, jus post bellum requires more: it is about responsibility and 
accountability. In this way, jus post bellum demands a two-fold approach to justice, the ‘just 
peace’ (the post-war condition of the state) and what I call ‘agent culpability’ (the 
accountability of those responsible for the crime of – or crimes in – war).11  
                                                            
11 Orend elaborates on this and puts forth six criteria: ‘proportionality and publicity’, ‘rights vindication’, 
‘discrimination’, ‘punishment’, ‘compensation’ and ‘rehabilitation’ Orend, B., (2002), "Justice After War", 
Ethics and International Affairs, 16:1 43-56.. Arguably, these six can be reduced to the two criteria I suggest. 
Furthermore, only discrimination, punishment, and compensation pose serious challenges to just war theory in 
an asymmetric context, and therefore I will elaborate these concepts more fully. 
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 ‘Just peace’ is a concept that looks at the final position of the combatants at the end 
of the war. It is a situation that describes the restoration of rights to the actors, the removal of 
the injustice(s) that initiated the conflict, and the transition from war to peace. Importantly, 
the means to achieving this (the post-war settlement) must be proportionate to the cause of 
the conflict (otherwise the post –war settlement itself becomes an injustice) (Orend, B., 2002: 
46-47). It must ensure that the original injustice has been righted, and seen to be righted: 
essentially, the “aggression” has been rolled back. The establishment of a just peace may also 
involve compensation, the reparations that the aggressor state makes to the victim(s) in order 
to help repair some of the damage caused by the war. Finally, there must be some guarantee 
that future aggression does not occur. 
‘Agent culpability’ determines responsibility, and is a necessary part in developing 
the just peace. Essentially, there are two parts: who is responsible for the conflict, and if they 
are responsible, what should the response (punishment) be? In determining responsibility, 
one must discriminate between those who are guilty and those who are not. Furthermore, 
discrimination must also provide for varying levels of guilt, as well as different types of guilt 
(collective and individual). Having determined the extent of responsibility, it is necessary to 
develop a response that maintains the justice of the conflict by being proportionate in the 
exercise of punishment.  
Jus Post Bellum: A Moral Conclusion 
The problem of distinction becomes most apparent in the situation of providing 
“rehabilitation” and “compensation”. If, as Orend argues, the “victim state” is deserving of 
some compensation for being wronged, who is going to provide it? Despite the claims Orend 
makes, that an aggressor nation’s elite has “historically…abused their power internally to 
accumulate personal fortunes”, it would be difficult to argue that an insurgency organisation 
A l l ’ s   W e l l   T h a t   E n d s   W e l l ?   P a g e  | 54 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Stephen McGuinness         200414325 
 
would have the resources to repay a state the larger costs of a counterinsurgency war. 
Insurgents are by definition inferior in terms of power when compared to the state, and this 
means that they are economically inferior as well. As such, demanding compensation from an 
“aggressor” insurgent force seems problematic. Similarly, insurgent organisations have very 
little in terms of institutions that can be reformed. It is true that rehabilitation via 
demilitarisation and disarmament remains crucial in an insurgency context, yet the ideas like 
“deep structural transformation toward a peaceable liberal democratic society” do not seem as 
relevant (Orend, B., 2002: 56). 
Although it is important to call everyone to account for their conduct within a conflict, 
insurgents and counterinsurgents alike (and war crimes tribunals seem to be a sufficient 
means for achieving this), the issue of accountability for the “crime of war” is more difficult. 
In asymmetric warfare, because there are strong ties between the populace and the insurgent, 
war-crimes tribunals as ‘victor’s justice’ may have the opposite effect. Instead of promoting 
post-war reconciliation and the transition to peace, it may in fact cause instability and further 
divisions within society, in that a well supported insurgent leader may be considered guilty of 
starting an aggressive war that they (and part of the populace) thought just.  
Counter-Insurgency and the Consequences of its Conduct 
In a conventional definition of jus in bello, targeting civilians means that the 
counterinsurgent is guilty of war crimes, and liable for punishment. Consequently, the 
increasing levels of violence that are required by the insurgent to “manage” their own 
casualty levels would also fall under war crimes. In short, a counterinsurgency war would not 
be able to be fought without the soldier being at certain risk of prosecution.  
Furthermore, the inability for the counterinsurgent to distinguish between “civilian” 
and “soldier” within the conflict has implications for the post-war distinction between the 
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two, and the designation of guilt. The “civilian” disguise does not simply apply to the 
‘soldier’, but to the ‘political’ hierarchy as well. How then, can the counterinsurgent after the 
war achieve justice if it is impossible to distinguish the guilty from the innocent? Similarly, if 
there was a strong connection between the insurgent and the population, is it possible to 
punish all involved, and how is it possible to distinguish the varying levels of culpability?   
The most noticeable effect of a counterinsurgency campaign is the aftermath of the 
tactics that are used. Put simply, counterinsurgency tactics and their effects make it difficult 
to establish the “just peace” and to make the transition from a state of war to peace. 
Counterinsurgency, in its optimal configuration between benevolence and prudence, still 
involves dividing communities by isolation to expose the insurgent; it still involves 
dissuading the populace from supporting the insurgent. As such, distrust, dislike, and fear of 
other communities may affect the post-war society, long after the reasons for the isolation 
have passed. 
Jus Post Bellum: The Puzzle Revisited 
In essence, jus post bellum requires the principles of discrimination and 
proportionality be carried through from the beginning to the end of a conflict, and that justice 
remain the focus. By definition, an insurgent is one the disguises himself as a civilian, 
deliberately making discrimination difficult. Yet for a post-war settlement to be just, 
discrimination must be observed. Proportionality is also difficult because in a 
counterinsurgency war, brutality is a means of casualty management, and “civilians” are tied 
inherently to the conflict. Yet, if a war becomes necessary, if the cause is so great as to justify 
a counterinsurgency war, then the use of brutality and “disproportionate” tactics to achieve a 
“just” end must be tempered by the need for the ability to provide a “just peace”, which is 
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inhibited by such brutality. Given this paradox, there is a need to discuss how justice can be 
achieved in a post-counterinsurgency-war situation. 
Part 2: Formulating a Response 
Jus Post Bellum: War as Justice 
War as justice ensures that the end goal of war is precisely that, justice. In this regard, 
war as justice does not seem unique or innovative; the most substantial discussion of jus post 
bellum has been on war crimes tribunals, which are in and of themselves, predicated on the 
quest for justice. In this sense, the definition of war as an “extraordinary extension of 
ordinary means of judgement” will seek to bolster such analyses. 
Just as the cause for a counterinsurgent war must be greater than that of a 
conventional war because of the increased cost to “civilians”, so too is the need for justice 
after a counterinsurgency war greater than a conventional war for the same reasons. Merom 
points out that counterinsurgency produces a much more defined normative difference 
because on the part of the counterinsurgent, because the war cannot be justified in terms of 
survival of the state (Merom, G., 2003: 21). Counterinsurgency war as justice requires the 
quest for justice all the way through, even after the cessation of hostilities. 
Jus Post Bellum: Culpability and Agency 
Counterinsurgency war as justice will therefore invoke the use of terms as guilt and 
innocence, and this, as mentioned earlier, is central to the obtaining of justice, and the 
establishment of a just peace. Walzer demands that we “search for guilty men” who are 
responsible for the crime of war, and jus post bellum provides the framework for doing so 
(Walzer, M., 2000: 109-110). Importantly, guilt is defined by one of two things: violations of 
jus ad bellum, or violations of jus in bello. In regards to the former, the Interim Report of the 
Winograd Commission is a step in this direction. The Interim Report focuses on the 
A l l ’ s   W e l l   T h a t   E n d s   W e l l ?   P a g e  | 57 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Stephen McGuinness         200414325 
 
“decisions related to starting the war”, and locates responsibility in the “highest political and 
military echelons” (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007: Section 6). 
However, the use of guilt and innocence in regards to jus ad bellum is problematic. It 
was suggested in the previous chapter that in an anarchic international system, there is no 
“judicial superior” to assign guilt, other than the protagonists themselves. Just as it is 
problematic to determine guilt in a counterinsurgency war, so too is it problematic to declare 
an actor who makes the decision to go to war “guilty”: such a definition may lead to the claim 
of “victor’s justice”. Bellamy explains how Grotius approached the problem: 
…objective justice was clouded by unavoidable ignorance. Whenever a 
state acted in good faith believing that it acted justly, it had ostensible 
subjective justice on its side and committed no wrong. (Bellamy, A. J., 
2006: 75) 
Yet if justice in terms of jus ad bellum can only be subjective, how then can one achieve 
justice in jus post bellum, and therefore establish the just peace? 
In the international realm, where there is no international arbiter, and guilt is 
dependent on an actor who is both judge and prosecutor. By defining guilt not in terms of 
“wrong” as O’Donovan does for jus in bello, but in terms of harm, most of the subjectivity 
regarding justice is overcome. In regards to war in general, jus post bellum aims at achieving 
justice on the basis of a harm that has been done. Discrimination between “civilians” and 
“insurgents” is defined by harm caused, i.e. an insurgent is involved in harming others, 
whereas a civilian is one who is not. Proportionality and punishment become based on the 
harm that is caused in the ad bellum and in bello phases of a war. This is important, because 
the need for justice and the transition to peace is usually based on the perception of harm 
caused.  
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Part 3: Exploring the Consequences 
Jus Post Bellum: Discrimination, Guilt and the Post-war Settlement 
Just as in jus ad bellum and jus in bello, jus post bellum must distinguish between 
those who are guilty and those who are not in providing a just post-war settlement. Guilt as 
culpability in the doing of harm provides an avenue for making this distinction. In this way, 
those who make the decision to go to war are guilty, in that they have done harm through the 
act of war itself. The doing of harm should encompass not only direct harm (the going to 
war), but also the provocation of war. In this sense, while it may seem harsh that a ‘victim’ 
could be called to be accountable for the decision to go to war, this reflects the original intent 
of the just war thinkers. Furthermore, guilt as culpability can also encompass not just state or 
national leaders, but is broad enough to allow for non-state actor leaders as well. Similarly, 
the population that supports the insurgent in going to war would also have to consider the 
consequences of being accused of “aggression”. The interconnectedness of the insurgent and 
the population means that if the insurgent leader is culpable of doing harm, the population 
shares some of that burden. The caveat lies in determining whether collective or individual 
guilt is the best approach.  
Importantly, in an asymmetric scenario, as the population is tied to the conflict, and 
are arguably more ‘active’ in the conflict than the population of a state, the idea of guilt and 
individual responsibility will involve these ‘civilians’. This definition means that 
discriminating between those who are guilty and those who are not is based on harm caused, 
and calls individual members of society to account. This does not mean that all of society 
would have the same level of guilt, but effectively, all would be called to account for their 
actions. The person who may have provided food and shelter for an insurgent band in good 
conscience or under coercion may be pardoned, the person who houses weapons and 
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misleads the counterinsurgent may be forced to contribute to the compensation/reparations 
that the insurgency may or may not be required to pay, while the insurgent leader may tried 
and gaoled. Orend’s claim that a post-war settlement that places all of society under the 
financial burden of socioeconomic sanctions is inherently unjust in that it fails to discriminate 
still holds (Orend, B., 2002: 48). However, in a counterinsurgency, the interconnectedness 
between the insurgent and the population means that by definition, there is a distribution of 
guilt (though there be differences in the proportion of guilt) and Walzer’s demand that the 
costs be distributed amongst society would then seem more discriminate, and in line with 
Orend’s proposition (Walzer, M., 2000: 297).  In this way, levels of culpability are 
proportionate to the levels of punishment.  
So what would this look like in practice? The most common form of response to an 
injustice by the UN Security Council, and in some respects, the punitive measures taken by 
the US and its allies after the 1990 Gulf War, is in the form of targeted sanctions. Such 
sanctions aim to impose direct punishment and culpability upon those who are directly 
responsible, usually the organisations that fund groups like al-Qaeda. For example, part of the 
response to the 9/11 attacks was through targeted financial sanctions, in the form of SCRs 
1373 (United Nations Security Council, 2001), and 1526(United Nations Security Council, 
2004). Targeted financial sanctions, as the name suggests, are the use of financial sanctions, 
such as the freezing of assets, the withholding of credits and loans, and the denial of foreign 
assistance, against specific entities or individuals, especially those organisations that fund 
“terrorist” groups. (Cortright, D., and Lopez, G. A., , 2002b: 94). Targeted financial sanctions 
are preferred to general sanctions as they “minimise unintended adverse consequences and 
achieve greater effectiveness” (Cortright, D., and Lopez, G. A., , 2002b: 93). Furthermore, 
they have been essential to the UNSC’s response to terrorism as they can be directed towards 
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organisations and individuals, not just to states (Cortright, D., and Lopez, G. A., , 2002a: 
115). While in the post-9/11 scenario, targeted financial sanctions are used in place of force, 
it is possible to see how this strategy can be used in a post-war settlement, and therefore 
provide a punitive measure that discriminates between the ‘guilty’ and the ‘innocent’. 
Jus Post Bellum: Compensation, Rehabilitation and Post-war Order 
 There is some debate about the practicality of punishment, compensation, and 
rehabilitation in the production of a just post-war order. It has been previously discussed that 
while guilt may be broad enough to encompass all of society, punishment may not affect 
everyone, and in some cases, it may not even be desirable, becoming a barrier to post-war 
order. In these cases, does the call for compensation still hold?  
Consider the case that Orend raises in regards to the post 9/11 war in Afghanistan. On 
the contested assumption that the war was in fact just, and that it was fought justly, did the 
US have the right to call for compensation for the damage caused by the 9/11 attacks? It 
could be argued that the damage caused to the financial markets as a result of the destruction 
of the World Trade Centre, as well as the actual cost of the destruction of the buildings 
themselves and to the surrounding financial district, would have warranted the US’s call that 
Afghanistan should be held responsible for part of the financial burden (Orend, B., 2002: 49). 
But the problem lies in again defining who is responsible for the costs. For the sake of the 
argument, assume that all citizens consented to the Taliban’s support for al-Qaeda’s attack, 
and as such, all citizens are therefore responsible for the costs. A post-war tax would possibly 
be Walzer’s demand. However, in a country that is suffering from poverty, the destruction of 
much of the infrastructure during the ensuing war, or simply the lack infrastructure in the first 
place, the feasibility of such compensation is poor. Orend points out that the interim Afghani 
government has in fact asked the US government for financial assistance in post-war 
A l l ’ s   W e l l   T h a t   E n d s   W e l l ?   P a g e  | 61 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Stephen McGuinness         200414325 
 
reconstruction (Orend, B., 2002: 49). Such as situation exhibits how punishment and 
compensation though possibly warranted in one sense, could in fact cause further injustice. 
Consider the case of the reparations clause of the Treaty of Versailles. Keynes argues: 
The policy of reducing Germany to servitude for a generation, of degrading the lives of 
millions of human beings, and of depriving a whole nation of happiness should be 
abhorrent and detestable,—abhorrent and detestable, even if it were possible, even if it 
enriched ourselves, even if it did not sow the decay of the whole civilized life of Europe. 
Some preach it in the name of Justice. In the great events of man's history, in the 
unwinding of the complex fates of nations Justice is not so simple. And if it were, nations 
are not authorized, by religion or by natural morals, to visit on the children of their 
enemies the misdoings of parents or of rulers. (Keynes, J. M., 1920) 
In terms of the Israel-Lebanon war, where the mainly Shi’a supporters of Hizbollah are also 
some of the poorest in Lebanon, the call for reparations for the bombing of cities like Haifa 
and Kiryat Shemona (which had 876 rockets fired at it (Erlich, R., 2006: 153)) would be 
incredibly difficult. Considering that the damage caused in Israel alone was estimated at $3.5 
billion, it would seem impossible for Hizbollah and southern Lebanon to pay that kind of 
compensation, especially in light of their own costs ($2.8 billion (Reuters, 2007)). 
The other difficulty is the rehabilitation of “aggressors”, especially if those aggressors 
are non-state or sub-state actors. Historically, states have encouraged insurgents to take part 
in the “rules of the game” through political integration. As such, insurgent groups like the 
IRA have established political parties in an effort to supplement and eventually replace the 
military wing. This process occurs as the result of compromise and moderation between the 
insurgent and the counterinsurgent. Specifically, the treating of captured insurgents as 
political prisoners or prisoners of war as opposed to criminals is a way of encouraging the 
insurgents to moderate their actions. As Merom points out, violence can only achieve so 
much, and once it exceeds its utility, it must therefore be replaced by more moderate 
approaches (Merom, G., 2003: 258). 
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Jus Post Bellum: War Crimes Tribunals – Vae Victus!12 Or Something More? 
Much attention has already been given to the topic of war crimes tribunals, whether 
they are simply victor’s justice or not, whether they are morally satisfying (O'Donovan, O., 
2003: 109), or whether they are even effective. The sixteenth century just war theorists 
argued against such measures, in that such an activity encouraged vengefulness and 
implacability (ideas that are inconsistent with justice), they undermined the ability for actors 
to act in “good faith”, and because they were seen as providing cause for future conflicts 
(O'Donovan, O., 2003: 109-110). Despite this criticism, authors like Bass, O’Donovan and 
Orend still maintain that war crimes tribunals serve a moral purpose, and are legitimate tools 
in establishing the just peace. 
Are war crimes tribunals the appropriate institution? The interconnectedness between 
the insurgent and the populace means that the trial of insurgent leaders may cause further 
instability. Orend points out that “sometimes such leaders…retain considerable popular 
legitimacy, and thus bringing them to trial could seriously destabilise the polity within the 
aggressor” (Orend, B., 2002: 53). There is a real need to consider the context, (and whether 
the trial of leaders will affect the post war stability), while on the other hand, there is the need 
for the prosecution of those guilty parties who have caused acted aggressively.  
Consider a hypothetical war crimes tribunal that could have been held in the aftermath 
of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war. Here is a situation where there are demands for justice in 
response to perceived war crimes: the abduction of soldiers, the shelling and bombing of 
residential areas, the placing of those residential areas at risk through the hiding of military 
equipment there, the use of disproportionate and indiscriminate weapons, etc. Both sides of 
the conflict (Israel and Hizbollah) would have been guilty of doing harm, especially harm 
                                                            
12 “Woe to the conquered!” 
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outside the traditional war convention. Underlying this particular war is the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. In addition to the various issues that caused the specific war, there are more general 
issues that will continue to provoke conflict. In scenario, the use of war crimes tribunals as 
something “truth and reconciliation” councils can help to provide the justice that is required, 
but still ensure the stability that is peace. While “truth and reconciliation” councils have been 
used within states to overcome specific issues that caused intra-state conflict, it is possible to 
imagine a similar institution functioning to resolve some of the deeper issues that underlie the 
2006 war. 
The problem though lies in its ability as an institution to actually achieve justice by 
bringing individuals to trial. In an insurgency context, this inability to bring the guilty parties 
to trial becomes even more difficult in that the insurgents are disguised as “civilians” and 
discrimination is difficult. One response would be to therefore hold all people accountable (as 
guilt of doing harm). In this sense, the opposite extreme occurs, where there are too many 
people to be put on trial: how does an institution like a war crimes tribunal cope with putting 
a large population on trial? Is a war crimes tribunal the appropriate institution for providing 
justice? By placing the insurgent in a position of responsibility for the actions of the 
community as a whole, war crimes tribunals can overcome these problems and remain 
relevant. How so? 
In democratic institutions, responsibility is thrust upon the state, especially the 
political leaders. In democracies, leaders can be defined in terms of their “representativeness” 
in relation to the population. If a nation commits aggression, then the leaders who represent 
the people are the ones who are held accountable for that aggression. Walzer argues that 
leaders who act in the name of the state do not diminish their culpability despite the fact that 
they act in “the national interest”; and he makes the same case for revolutionaries (and by 
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association, non-state/sub-state actors) (Walzer, M., 2000: 290). In this way, insurgent 
leaders are representative of the populations that support them, and are therefore held 
accountable for the actions that are committed in their name. While guilt as the doing of harm 
may encompass the whole community, the insurgent who disguises himself as a “civilian” is 
therefore accountable for the actions taken by the community.  
Conclusion 
It is an aspect of the theory that ensures that war is limited by providing a solution to 
the war that inhibits further conflict. Essentially this means the production of a peace that is 
“better” than the peace that existed prior to the war. As such, the principles of jus post bellum 
are designed to facilitate the development of a just post-war settlement, and subsequent post-
war order that reflects the ideals of discrimination and proportionality that are central to just 
war theory. As such, this chapter firstly placed the post war settlement in the context of war 
as justice, and as such, ensured that such a settlement did achieve justice, by showing that 
justice was achieved through the war, and that the guilty were held accountable. 
Subsequently, three problems were analysed. The first dealt with the puzzle of using this 
definition of guilt in providing a post-war settlement. Key to this puzzle was the fact that as 
society (being connected to the insurgent) shared the guilt of the insurgent who did the actual 
harm. As such, discrimination remains intact even if a post war settlement were to encompass 
all of society. Following from this, the puzzle of compensation and rehabilitation, and its 
effects on the provision of post-war stability, was discussed. If the Victim for the war 
deserved compensation, this could only work if such “punishment” did not cause harm to the 
victim society, and therefore cause further injustice. The final problem dealt with the much-
discussed puzzle of war crimes tribunals, and whether they are suitable solutions in the 
context of asymmetric warfare. Importantly, just as the society can share the burden of guilt 
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through compensation, insurgents can share the burden of guilt through war crimes tribunals. 
Furthermore, because asymmetric wars can often have underlying causes other than those 
that initially started the war, there is a need for war crimes tribunals to function in a similar 
way to “truth and reconciliation” councils as well. 
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Afterword 
Reclaiming the Just War for Moral Political Theory 
 
 
This thesis has aimed to provide a reconsideration of just war theory so that it can 
remain relevant to asymmetric warfare. Underpinning this thesis is the importance of the 
individual. Importantly for just war theory, the individual has worth, and harm is therefore 
wrong. Secondly, the individual is moral and rational, and therefore subject to moral praise or 
blame. Furthermore, this thesis builds on Merom’s analysis that shows a dialectic of restraint 
between ‘civil society’ and the ‘state’. And because the insurgent is ‘representative’ of the 
population that supports it, there is a similar dialect there as well. 
Beginning with “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants”, just war theory was shown to 
provide a better account of the moral aspects of war, as well as provide a better framework 
for war as a whole (its inception, prosecution, and conclusion) than both realist theory and 
pacifism. Realist theory failed to provide any restraint on war, while pacifism, through its 
dismissal of all war as immoral, also failed to provide a way forward. Just war theory 
therefore stood alone as the best available vehicle for an analysis of the moral aspects of war. 
However, in its current state, its application to the prevalent methods of warfare, namely 
asymmetric warfare, was limited. This thesis therefore aimed to fill that gap.  
In “In Good Conscience”, the decision to go to war was shown to be a moral one, and 
as such, had to take into account factors like ‘just cause’, ‘right intention’, and 
‘proportionality of ends’. Of most importance was the question of whether non-state and sub-
state actors have the authority to declare war. Even though this authority was traditionally 
reserved for those without a judicial superior, the post-Westphalian idea that a sub-state actor 
gains legitimacy through their ‘representativeness’ of their population gives them such 
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authority. Furthermore, the implications are that if a sub-state actor has legitimacy, then 
consequently, they will be bound by the other principles of just war theory as well. 
“Defining the Limits” dealt with the difficult problem of discrimination and 
proportionality in a context where the insurgents not only disguised themselves as those who 
were ‘immune’, but also used tactics that aimed to maximise the human cost of the war. By 
defining culpability as those who are involved in the direct material cooperation in the doing 
of harm, discrimination was made practical. In this context, ‘isolation’ provided a balance 
between moral restraint and military prudence. Furthermore, the population’s support 
afforded the insurgent their legitimacy, and therefore encouraged the insurgent to abide by 
the principles of just war theory. Finally, reciprocity and restraint on the part of the 
counterinsurgent provided even further encouragement for the insurgent to moderate their 
conduct. 
“All’s Well That Ends Well” showed how the principles of discrimination and 
proportionality were important in the post-war situation as well. Specifically, ‘agent 
culpability’ (dealing with the guilty actors) and ‘just peace’ (providing a just post-war order) 
were the building blocks for the just resolution of conflict. Agent culpability defines those 
who are guilty of wrongdoing (harm) in the inception and conduct of the conflict. On this 
basis, steps to the just peace can be taken, through the punishment of the guilty actors, and 
the restitution of the victim. Importantly, ‘compensation’, ‘rehabilitation’, and ‘war-crimes’ 
tribunals were important in developing this just peace. 
In light of the persistence of war, there is a real need for fruitful and relevant 
discussions about its nature, and prescriptions for its limitation. This is the place of just war 
theory. The changing nature of war, specifically the use of asymmetric strategies by those 
actors who in a Westphalian context would have been dismissed as illegitimate, has provided 
A f t e r w o r d   P a g e  | 68 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Stephen McGuinness         200414325 
 
a challenge for just war theory. Yet, for just war theory to remain as a practical framework, 
for it to remain a useful and relevant tool in limiting war, it must meet this challenge. This 
thesis is a step in that direction. It has shown that there is a way for asymmetric warfare to be 
placed in under the principles of just war theory, for asymmetric strategies to be limited by 
moral restraint, and shown that the ultimate goal is the development a peace that reflects the 
individual’s rights. 
It is this assumption, this foundation of just war theory, that can have larger 
consequences by providing a basis for international political science as a whole. Just as the 
importance, worth, rationality and morality of the individual has been used to analyse war in 
the specific, so too can this assumption be used as a basis for analysing the relations between 
states, and between non-state actors and the state. It is the importance and worth of the 
individual that defines his rights, and it is his rights that in turn define the state’s rights and 
responsibilities. 
Though the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War is still recent, and the true after-effects are still 
developing, we see through this study of those events that just war theory can apply in 
asymmetric contexts, and that as developments arise, there is still much to discover. This 
thesis is by no means definitive, nor does it give justice to depth and complexity of the 
situation. However, it does provide a basis and a direction for others. 
And so there remains a real need for further study in this area, and every step in this 
direction works toward limiting the suffering and harm caused by war. And while we look to 
the day where swords will be beaten in to plowshares, we know that that reality is not yet. We 
still need giants, so that the rest of us may stand and see far. 
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